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ABSTRACT 
 
From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatiza-
tion” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime 
subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by 
mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese 
corporate law system has been cannibalized by all-encompassing securi-
ties regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies 
with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained interven-
tion and makes a case—wholly contrary to the “quack corporate gov-
ernance” critique much aired in the United States—that for the PRC this 
phenomenon is necessary, appropriate, and benign. That analysis, in 
turn, reveals a great deal about the following: the development of Chi-
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nese law and legal institutions after 1979; China’s contemporary politi-
cal economy; the true identity of the firm under the PRC “corporatiza-
tion without privatization” program; the normative character and func-
tion of corporate law across increasingly globalized capital markets; 
and the ways in which state intervention may protect against state abuse 
of power and enable greater private autonomy. For analysts of China’s 
contemporary political system, this Article uncovers a new identity of the 
Chinese party state’s horizontally oriented “fragmented authoritarian-
ism,” where a central government agency has instituted pre-enforcement 
designs that systemically constrain the economic and directorial power 
of the PRC’s most powerful, formally non-governmental, political eco-
nomic actors. 
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After a decade of experimentation and experience, effectively-
implemented supervision systems and methods [for Chinese listed 
companies] are in place. However, these supervisory systems and 
methods stop in large part at the level of administrative regulation 
and policy, resulting in too large a gap for effective enforcement 
[between such administrative regulation and] national laws like the 
Company Law, the Securities Law, etc., and a lack of required co-
herence [in the legal-regulatory system]. 
– State Council of the PRC, Legal  
Affairs Office, September 7, 2007
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the start of its “corporatization” project in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, corporate law and corporate governance in the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC or China) have been determined by China’s securi-
ties regulator acting far beyond the bounds of parallel structures with 
which the terms “corporate” and “law” are associated. Indeed, the broad 
extent of China’s securities regulation incursion into the notionally sepa-
rate domain of PRC corporate law should cause purveyors of a “quack 
corporate governance” complaint in the United States the deepest alarm. 
The received “quack corporate governance” wisdom directed at re-
cent U.S. legal and regulatory reforms has been well publicized. In this 
Article, after briefly taking note of that critique, I analyze the trajectory 
witnessed in China over the last two decades: the veritable cannibaliza-
tion of corporate law norms by securities agency regulation which solely 
determines the governance of China-domiciled companies with listed 
stock. This analysis serves several functions: First, it allows for a better 
understanding, generally, regarding the development of Chinese law and 
legal institutions in the post-1979 reform era and, specifically, key legal 
institutions operating at the heart of China’s corporate system during the 
establishment and rapid expansion of domestic capital markets. Second, 
this study helps elaborate the true identity of the modern Chinese firm 
under the PRC’s “corporatization” program and in that nation’s special 
political economy, and how it differs from business organizations in oth-
                                                             
 1. “Shanghshi Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Tiaoli (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao)” Qicao Shuoming [Expla-
nation of the Drafting of “Articles for the Administration and Supervision of Listed Companies 
(Comment Draft)”] attached to Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi Guanyu Gongbu “Shanghshi Gongsi 
Jiandu Guanli Tiaoli (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao)” Ji Qi Shuoming Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian De Tongzhi 
[Notice of the State Council Legal Affairs Office Regarding Promulgation of “Articles of the Ad-
ministration and Supervision of Listed Companies (Comment Draft).” It’s Explanation and Seeking 
Public Comments], at one time available at http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn (last visited Sept. 9, 2007) 
(on file with the author). 
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er developed and developing world jurisdictions. Third, this Article aids 
us in pondering the very nature of corporate law itself and how its norms 
function on firms and shareholders situated in vastly different political 
economic circumstances and even across globalized capital markets. 
Fourth, I hope that the analysis here will prod serious thinking about how 
private autonomy can be protected in the corporate commercial spheres 
of different political economies and the perhaps counterintuitive role 
state-enforced mandatory provisions can play in remedying structurally 
determined exploitation of minority shareholders in what is presented as 
a neutral and autonomy-conferring legal architecture. Fifth and finally, I 
believe that this Article reveals a highly complex, and horizontally ori-
ented, identity of what political scientists have called the PRC party 
state’s “fragmented authoritarianism”—or how vertically arranged silo-
systems of power in what is understood as a unitary party state are per-
mitted to compete and constrain horizontally situated, short-term fo-
cused, political economic power in the service of long-term economic 
system and development policy goals. 
II. THE “QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE” CRITIQUE 
The last ten years in the United States have seen a volley of cri-
tiques directed at high profile corporate law and governance reforms im-
plemented through federal securities law and agency regulatory action. 
This criticism originated with U.S. law academics,
2
 who were profoundly 
offended by the incursion of U.S. federal regulation into the domain of 
U.S. state regulation principally through the July 2002 and July 2010 
legislative enactments known as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)3 
and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
                                                             
 2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1781 (2011); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in 
the Wake of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
251 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes–Oxley After 
Three Years, 3 N.Z. L. REV. 365 (2005); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making 
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). However, the critique is not unani-
mous or entirely despairing. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes–Oxley As 
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1845 (2007) (con-
testing the Romano critique of SOX point by point); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1022–26 (2012) (dubbing the “quack corporate governance” complainants a 
“‘Tea Party Caucus’ of corporate and securities law professors . . . .”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601–07 (2003); Clark, supra, at 290 (asserting that Delaware 
is quite up to the challenge presented by encroaching federal securities regulation). 
 3. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (hereinafter SOX). 
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(Dodd–Frank)4 respectively, but also other Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulatory initiatives pre-dating SOX.
5
 Indeed, the 
push back is not simply academic, as even sitting state-level judges open-
ly lament these developments,
6
 and U.S. federal courts almost casually 
invalidate regulatory action perfectly consistent with the spirit of the 
SEC’s mission or explicitly sourced in such statutory enactments, and 
pursuant to an incorrect standard of review for rule-makings by inde-
pendent agencies.
7
 
A good number of the substantive provisions of SOX and Dodd–
Frank—many resulting in amendments to the 1934 Securities and Ex-
change Act (1934 Act)—have attracted academic and judicial fire.8 The 
                                                             
 4. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (hereinafter Dodd–Frank). 
 5. For example, the SEC’s attempt to require one share, one vote (i.e., forbid dual-class com-
mon) for publicly listed companies was invalidated by the U.S. federal courts in 1990. See infra note 
7. 
 6. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & William B. Chandler III, The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) (describing federal SOX-origin prescriptive rules as “shadow corporation 
law”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Con-
structive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079 (2008) (attacking SOX and 
its enactment of federal laws affecting corporate governance). 
 7. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating the SEC’s 
attempt to forbid dual-class common); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(invalidating the SEC’s proxy access Rule 14a-11). The role of the U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in this regard has increasingly attracted press attention. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Circuit Court 
Needs to Let the SEC Do Its Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012, at B1; Ben Protess, As Wall Street 
Fights Regulation It Has Back Up on the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at B2. For elegant 
academic laments, see James Cox & Benjamin Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting 
the DC Circuit Usurpation of SEC Rule-Making Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012) (on the 
invalidation of 1934 Act Rule 14a-11 by the D.C. Circuit, “Our conclusion is that the D.C. Circuit 
has assumed for itself a role opposed to the one Congress prescribed for courts reviewing SEC 
rules.”). 
 8. Including a collection of what Dean Clark calls “conflict-reducing” and “action-inducing” 
rules: the entirely independent director requirement for audit committees (SOX, § 301); the prohibi-
tion on accounting firms’ provision of non-audit services (including financial information system 
design and implementation; appraisal or valuation services; internal auditing services; investment 
banking services; legal and expert services unrelated to audit brokerage services; and actuarial ser-
vices) to audit clients (SOX, § 201); the prohibition of corporate loans to officers or directors (SOX, 
§ 402(a)); executive certification of periodic reports and financial statements (SOX, § 302); entirely 
independent director requirement for compensation committees (Dodd–Frank, § 952; 1934 Act 
§ 10C; and Rule 10C-1 (June 2012)); direct regulation of the use of compensation consultants 
(Dodd–Frank; 1934 Act, § 10C; and Rule 10C-1 (June 2012)); “claw back” of incentive-based com-
pensation received by executive officers at public companies where there has been an accounting 
restatement (Dodd–Frank, § 954; 1934 Act, § 10D); mandated (advisory) shareholder vote on execu-
tive compensation at least once every three years; the grant of power to company shareholders to 
determine how often review of executive compensation should occur during that three year period 
(Dodd–Frank, § 951; 1934 Act, § 14A); “comply or explain” requirement regarding whether chair-
person of the board and CEO posts are split (Dodd–Frank, section 972; 1934 Act, § 14B); and a 
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rationales supporting sharp criticism of these law-making efforts and as-
sociated regulatory actions are equally numerous, with what I believe to 
be the primary ones summarized as follows: 
 In the U.S. federal system, the individual states have exclusive 
jurisdiction over corporate law mandates, and thus, the national 
legislature (the U.S. Congress) has no authority to pass legisla-
tion in the same area, much less pass legislative directives 
mandating federal agency regulation in the same areas; any at-
tempt to change this allocation represents a usurping transfer of 
power from the states to the federal government (the “state ju-
risdiction” critique). 
 In the words of Roberta Romano, “[T]he more efficacious cor-
porate and securities law regimes are the product of competitive 
legal systems, which permit legal innovations to percolate from 
the bottom up by trial and error, rather than being imposed 
from the top down by regulators or corporate governance entre-
preneurs, who are far removed from the day-to-day operations 
of firms”9 (the “legal systems market/laboratories of federal-
ism” critique). 
 The reform mandates operate so as to eat away at the allegedly 
beneficial norms (for organizational decision making) of direc-
tor primacy/board centrism and thus frustrate the governance 
efficiencies promised by thoroughgoing separation of owner-
ship and management (the “director primacy” critique). 
 The packaging of what could have been conventional securities 
regulatory disclosure mandates as substantive corporate gov-
ernance mandates is more costly (the “choice of regulatory ap-
proach cost” critique). 
 Compliance with reform mandates is a new cost incurred by 
regulated firms, and is in absolute terms pretty expensive, with 
no or little benefit (the “costs of new compliance/cost-benefit” 
critique). 
                                                                                                                                        
statutory requirement that public companies include shareholder nominees on proxies (Dodd–Frank, 
§ 971; 1934 Act, § 14 (amended); and judicially invalidated Rule 14a-11). 
 9. Romano, supra note 2, at 1529; see also id. at 1598–99 (echoing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002)); Bainbridge, 
supra note 2, at 1795 (“[T]he uniformity imposed by [U.S.] federal law precludes experimentation 
with differing modes of regulation. Accordingly, as the sphere of federal domination grows, the 
room for new and better regulatory ideas to be developed shrinks. Instead of the laboratories of 
federalism, we risk being stuck with rules that may well be wrong from the outset and, because 
Washington moves only in response to crises, may quickly become obsolete.”) 
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 The prospect of burdensome compliance with reform mandates 
applied through national securities law and regulation causes 
externally domiciled issuers to avoid the reform-regulated capi-
tal markets or flee from the reform-regulated market to less 
burdensome capital markets (the “unattractive to securities is-
suers” critique). 
 Many of the federal corporate governance legislative initiatives 
carried by the likes of SOX and Dodd-Frank are long-standing 
ideas advocated unsuccessfully by “corporate governance en-
trepreneurs” acting for allegedly undeserving constituencies 
and thus are not appropriate responses to, or remedies for, the 
alleged triggering events (Enron, WorldCom, the Global Finan-
cial Crisis, etc.) (the “opportunistic packaging of spurious pre-
ventatives” critique). 
 Empirical studies demonstrate that the proposed substantive re-
forms do not “work” (e.g., reduce wrongdoing, make fiduciar-
ies more independent, improve fiduciaries’ or firm perfor-
mance, increase firm value, benefit investors generally, allow 
investors to distinguish between good and bad firms, etc.—
there being some real variance on precisely what desired effect 
is not brought about, often in the same paper) (the “empirical 
studies demonstrate ineffectiveness” critique). 
 The subject federal laws are classic “bubble laws,”10 enacted in 
a hurry, on an accelerating “bandwagon” (in Dean Clark’s 
phrase), and determined by legislators’ reelection concerns in 
the context of “media frenzy” and heightened public attention 
to (or “populist” backlash regarding) corporate malfeasance and 
scandals rather than sober give-and-take over policy by experts 
and “legitimate” constituencies; legislators did not notice, or 
ignored, prior academic work proving that proposed corporate 
governance mandates would be ineffective after enactment (the 
“bad, panicked, uninformed, badly informed, and inexpert leg-
islative process” critique). 
 The incursions of federal securities regulation into the domain 
of state corporate law operate in only one direction, or with a 
“ratchet”—there is no going back once the poison has been in-
troduced (the “ratchet” critique). 
 
                                                             
 10. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1784–86. 
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Of interest in this list of complaints is the lack of attention to two 
other critiques which might be appropriately leveled against this devel-
opment—a disregard that may arise from the relative U.S.-centrism of 
the major academics carrying the attack. 
First, there is very little invocation or exploration of the fact that 
corporate law and securities regulation are different areas of law—they 
are sourced in different traditions, with different aims and design, mostly 
different subjects, and entirely different modes of operation. Perhaps 
U.S. academics do not allude to this problem very often because it is 
subsumed in the U.S. federalism-specific “state jurisdiction” critique 
précised above. I will refer to this below as the “distinct legal systems” 
critique. Embedded in this critique is a more philosophical and essential-
ly libertarian concern, or a worry about “state” incursion into the realm 
of “free” and “private” ordering—a sub-strand which takes on extra 
weight when the jurisdiction at issue is not a liberal democracy but an 
avowedly authoritarian state such as China. 
Second, no U.S. academic I know of points to the strong likelihood 
of a transnational cannibalization of corporate law arising from the sub-
ject phenomenon
11—where an issuer domiciled in Country A becomes 
subject to the corporate governance-related norms imposed by Country 
B’s securities regulation, and the national corporate law of country A is 
overridden, denied, or substantially altered. This is a violation of what 
the United States calls in its domestic federal context the “internal affairs 
doctrine” (judicial institutions look to the laws of the state of incorpora-
tion to determine the rights and duties of firm participants), only now 
working across international, not U.S. state, borders. Again, this is rarely 
addressed because U.S. corporate law and even securities law academics 
do not spend enough time worrying about the extraterritorial reach and 
effect of U.S. law and regulation on governance at foreign-domiciled 
firms (as opposed to securities issuance and disclosure by such firms). 
But they should, as the effect in our increasingly globalized capital mar-
kets can be significant. One only needs to consider, for example, the ef-
fect on the corporate law and governance applicable to a major Dela-
ware-incorporated U.S. multinational firm. If that firm were to list shares 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or commence a China Depositary Re-
ceipts (CDRs) program directed at a Chinese stock exchange—initiatives 
                                                             
 11. Larry Ribstein alluded to the issue very briefly in his many writings on the subject but in 
the context of increased costs for foreign private issuers accessing the U.S. capital markets or simple 
“lack of fit,” not the effect of U.S. securities regulation corporate governance-related mandates on 
the corporate law and corporate governance regime applicable to the foreign issuer under its national 
law. See, e.g., Ribstein, Sarbanes–Oxley After Three Years, supra note 2, at 377, 382. 
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sure to be implemented in the next couple of years (and already seen in 
the sub-continent with the listing of Standard Chartered Bank’s shares on 
an Indian exchange)
12—whereby the mandates of Delaware corporate 
law, U.S. securities law, and U.S. exchange regulation will be substan-
tially overridden, that Delaware-incorporated firm will immediately be-
come subject to the PRC securities agency-imposed corporate govern-
ance norms described here. I refer to this as the “transnational effect” 
critique below. 
III. “QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE” AS TRADITIONAL                    
CHINESE MEDICINE 
By comparison, the thirty-year development of a legal corporate 
governance regime in the PRC makes the U.S.-origin “quack corporate 
governance” concern seem decidedly quaint. In China, the exact opposite 
of the U.S. development path deemed in need of protection has unfolded. 
Rather than zealously patrolling the fragile border between corporate 
governance norms and securities regulation, the PRC’s public company 
regulators (strongly supported by some Chinese legislators, other execu-
tive departments, and academics) boldly and consistently acted to create, 
re-craft, or anticipate the most fundamental aspects of the nation’s formal 
legal corporate governance system, in both design and application, and 
institute extremely robust board-related norms, shareholder-empowering 
norms, or both.
13
 Indeed, the PRC securities regulator’s implemented 
                                                             
 12. For Shanghai listings by foreign-domiciled issuers, see Enoch Yiu, Shanghai Bourse Stud-
ies Listing of Multinationals, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 13, 2012, 11:26 AM), http://www.scm 
p.com/article/616267/shanghai-bourse-studies-listing-multinationals; Whole Bank, Not Just HSBC 
China, for Shanghai Listing, STANDARD, Dec. 12, 2007; Sundeep Tucker & Justine Lau, Beijing Set 
to Encourage Foreign Listings, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2008, 1:21 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 
0/7954771a-c51b-11dc-811a-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2gszeYiYM; NYSE Set to List on Shanghai 
Exchange, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 14, 2012, 1:22 AM), http://www.scmp.com/article 
/633770/nyse-set-list-shanghai-exchange; David Barboza, Shanghai Exchange Finalizing Plans for 
Foreign Listings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/business/global/ 
16exchange.html?_r=0; and Shanghai Mayor Says Time Not Right for Exchange’s International 
Board, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-16/shangh 
ai-mayor-says-timing-not-right-for-international-board.html. For CDRs, see Zhang Jiwei, CDR 
Zoufeng [CDR Whirlwind], 39 CAIJING MAG., June 2001, at 58–60 (China); and Michael Wei & 
Jason Subler, Reuters Summit—BNY Mellon Sees First China Depositary Receipt Listings Next Year, 
REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/09/02/reuters-su 
mmit-bny-mellon-sees-first-china-depository-receipt-listings-next-year/. 
 13. It is only fair to note that the problem is apparent in the other direction too, whereby the 
company law statute has a good number of provisions that might normally be considered the prov-
ince of a securities law and regulatory regime. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa 
[The Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong. Oct. 
27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 PRC Company Law], in XIANXING ZHENGQUAN 
QIHUO FAGUI HUIBIAN (XIUDINGBEN) [SECURITIES AND FUTURES LAW AND REGULATION 
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policies, rule-makings, and enforcement practices—at times exceeding or 
breaching the constraints of formal legislation—embody very well the 
extraordinary power many of China’s agencies have in the PRC’s specif-
ic institutional context. This process has advanced so far in China that 
the consumer side of the legal regime—defendant fiduciaries (and their 
counsel) and even Chinese courts—continue to argue that claims for 
breach of legal duties at listed companies should not be heard in the Peo-
ple’s Courts applying corporate law, but instead before the PRC securi-
ties regulator applying only securities law and regulation.14 
While there are simply too many expressions of this phenomenon to 
completely catalogue here,
15
 a number of the most interesting examples 
are described below to demonstrate how profound the contrary orienta-
tion in the PRC is. 
Reviewing these examples, corporate law specialists will note im-
mediately that the PRC securities regulator—the CSRC—made these 
bold incursions into the corporate law domain via two distinct methods 
with immediately discernible, and different, prospects of effectiveness: 
(i) the filling-in of substantive corporate law doctrines, which still have 
to be enforced by a state actor, whether the judiciary or a regulator (e.g., 
corporate fiduciary duties); and (ii) the establishment of “self-enforcing” 
mechanisms, which are meant to be effective as between the parties to a 
firm long before the state needs to be involved in enforcement, if at all 
(e.g., minority shareholder “class” negative veto rights). As discussed in 
more detail below, one of the many ironies of this development path in 
the PRC is that the CSRC and other Chinese bureaucracies have em-
                                                                                                                                        
CURRENTLY IN EFFECT (REVISED EXITION)] (China Securities Regulatory Commission ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter CSRC Laws and Regulations], at 72–84, chapt. V, §§ 1 (issuance of shares), 2 (transfer 
of shares) & chapt. VII (company bonds). 
 14. See Wang Dianxue, Shanghai Gongsi Dongshi Beifa Zhuanggao Zhengjianhui [Penalized 
Director of a Listed Company Sues CSRC], XINJINGBAO [NEW CAPITAL NEWS], June 4, 2008 (Chi-
na) (plaintiff suing the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to overturn a fine asserts 
that although he is a corporate director, he has not breached the legal duties of directors set forth in 
the 2006 PRC Securities Law, in his view the exclusive source of such duties for directors of listed 
companies, preempting entirely the 2006 PRC Company Law and its legal duties for directors). 
Much earlier, in March 1999, and before the coming into effect of China’s first Securities Law, the 
Pudong New District People’s Court (not a defendant fiduciary or its counsel) took a similar view 
when it refused to hear China’s first public shareholder’s lawsuit—explicitly grounded in the 1994 
PRC Company Law—on the basis that “[t]he plaintiff’s case regarding behavior in violation of 
securities laws and regulations in the stock market should be handled by the CSRC. The plaintiff’s 
suit regarding a securities dispute does not come within the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts.” See 
Jiang Shuzhen v. Hongguang Industry Co. Directors, in XU ZHAOHONG & ZHENG HUI, 
ZHENGQUANFA ANLI JINGJIE [SELECTED SECURITIES LAW CASES] 58–64 (2001) (China). 
 15. The Appendix lists some of the most important PRC regulatory enactments directly impact-
ing corporate law and governance. 
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ployed mandatory rules to make the nation’s company law more “self-
enforcing,” even as the PRC Company Law from 1994 to 2006 and be-
yond has explicitly moved in the opposite direction: towards greater use 
of enabling default rules and ever-broader invitations to the Chinese ju-
diciary to enforce standards ex post.
16
 
A. Corporate Fiduciary Duties 
It is not an exaggeration to say that corporate fiduciary duties for 
orthodox corporate fiduciaries and even controlling shareholders initially 
came into Chinese corporate law from outside of the corporate law and 
largely at the hands of the PRC’s early securities regulatory bureaucracy 
and then the CSRC. As I have detailed elsewhere, in June 1993 and be-
fore the PRC had an effective company law statute, the PRC Commis-
sion on Restructuring of the Economic System (CRES), by a letter to the 
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission glossing language con-
tained in a sub-statutory regulation, absorbed all then-current Hong Kong 
(and thus English) fiduciary duties jurisprudence into Chinese law, at 
least for PRC-domiciled firms issuing stock and listing in pre-Handover 
Hong Kong.
17 When the language glossed in the 1993 CRES letter was 
subsequently dropped from the PRC’s first Company Law, effective in 
mid-1994,
18 the CSRC reinstated the all-important language in a regula-
tory “addendum” applicable to Chinese firms suddenly subject to the 
fiduciary duties-deficient 1994 Company Law but issuing stock into 
Hong Kong. This language reinstatement through an agency rule-making 
was effected explicitly to recover and maintain the wholesale importation 
of corporate fiduciary duties into the law applicable to PRC-domiciled 
firms listing “overseas” (Hong Kong and beyond), which was previously 
                                                             
 16. See Nicholas C. Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, 1992–2008: 
Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 303, 316–27 (2010) 
[hereinafter Corporate Law in the Shanghai Courts]. 
 17. See Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name—Anglo-American 
Fiduciary Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence, 
in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193, 210–11 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-sik 
Kim & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2008) [hereinafter Doctrine That Dared Not]. The CRES letter stated 
that four Chinese characters (chengxin zeren) in the then-governing legal basis for joint stock com-
pany establishment (the CRES “Opinions on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares”) “[h]as 
the same type of meaning (jüyou leiside hanyi) as fiduciary duty under Hong Kong law” with the 
words rendered here as “fiduciary duty” in English in the otherwise Chinese language letter. Id. 
 18. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong. Dec. 27, 1993, effective July 1, 1994, and as amended 
Dec. 25, 1999 and Aug. 28, 2004), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law 
&ID=641 [hereinafter 1994 PRC Company Law]. 
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accomplished in the 1993 CRES letter.
19
 Realists will understand this 
incorporation and then reinstatement as largely symbolic and directed at 
foreign perceptions, and very easy for both the CRES and the Hong 
Kong Securities and Futures Commission to effect with little cost or im-
mediate consequence. While that view has merit with respect to the 
events of 1993–1994 and the effort to complete the PRC’s first “over-
seas” initial public offerings, this rhetorical absorption of a developed 
body of common law corporate fiduciary duties almost two decades ago 
was only the start of a sustained campaign by the Chinese bureaucracy to 
introduce and make fast the very notion of corporate fiduciary duties in 
Chinese law, culminating in formal adoption and articulation of these 
duties in article 148 of the 2006 PRC Company Law. 
After July 1994, faced with an inadequate 1994 PRC Company 
Law lacking any explicit statement of corporate fiduciary duties (and 
only a vague loyalty provision and a scattering of duty of loyalty-related 
prohibitions),
20
 various state bureaucracies, but primarily the CSRC, con-
tinued to push corporate fiduciary duties into corporate law via Chinese 
regulations and administrative enactments binding on listed firms.
21 For 
instance, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC)
22 and CRES 
accomplished this—with some real teeth—for PRC-domiciled firms list-
ing both overseas and domestically with the issuance of “mandatory” (for 
foreign listing firms) and “guidance” (for domestically listing firms) arti-
cles of association, which model firm constitutions are replete with dec-
larations of the duties of care and loyalty owed by fiduciaries to the firm 
and its shareholders, which did not then exist in Chinese corporate law.23 
                                                             
 19. See Doctrine That Dared Not, supra note 17, at 211. 
 20. See 1994 PRC Company Law, supra note 18, at arts. 59 (instructing “loyal” performance, 
protection of the interests of the company, and prohibiting acting for personal gain), 60 (prohibition 
against misappropriation of firm assets), 61 (prohibition against direct competition and unapproved 
related party transactions), 62 (confidentiality), 123 (applying the foregoing to companies limited by 
shares). 
 21. See, e.g., Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Principles for Listed Company Corporate Gov-
ernance] (promulgated by CSRC and State Econ. Trade Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2002), zhengjianfa [2002] 
1, CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 925–29 [hereinafter Listed Company Governance Provisions], 
art. 33 (“Directors should undertake their responsibilities loyally (zhongshi), in good faith (chengxin) 
and diligently (qinmian) in accordance with the best interests of the company and the entire body of 
shareholders.”). 
 22. The SCSC was a ministry-level body directly under the PRC State Council and originally 
superior to the CSRC. The SCSC was subsequently disbanded with the elevation of the CSRC to a 
ministry-level commission under the State Council. 
 23. See Guanyu Zhixing “Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan” de 
Tongzhi [Notice Regarding Implementation of the “Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas 
Listing Companies”] (promulgated by State Council Sec’s Comm’n & CRES, Aug. 27, 1994) 
zhengweifa [1994] 21, and the attached form of articles of association, CSRC Laws and Regulations, 
at 997–1008 [hereinafter Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas Listing Companies]; and 
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The acceptance of these corporate constitutions by Chinese firms and 
their shareholders was (and is) made mandatory by the CSRC’s notified 
practice of withholding any initial listing approval, or de-listing going 
forward, unless the issuer’s articles of association conform to the prom-
ulgated forms. Moreover, aside from the ability of shareholders to sue in 
something like contract for the breach of these governance provisions, 
there is evidence that the Chinese People’s Courts have enforced the 
terms of these “guiding” or “mandatory” articles of association as a kind 
of stand-alone legal-regulatory norm even in the rare case where a listed 
firm has not put in place conforming articles of association.
24
 
The same legal-regulatory alchemy was performed outside of the 
firm operations and management context via 2001 measures issued by 
the CSRC governing the acquisition of listed companies, which de-
clared—again without any basis in Chinese corporate law at the time—
that the target board of directors, supervisory board, and high-level man-
agement had what amounted to fiduciary duties to target stockholders 
and the target firm in approving or recommending an external offer and 
pre-decision process requirements that look suspiciously like those nor-
mally divined from the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1985 Van Gorkom25 
decision.
26
 
                                                                                                                                        
Guanyu Fabu “Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin” De Tongzhi [Notice Regarding the Issuance 
and Promulgation of the “Guidance Articles of Association for Listed Companies”] (promulgated by 
CSRC, Dec. 16, 1997) zhengjian [1997] 16, and the attached form of articles of association, availa-
ble at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=19599 [hereinafter Original 
Guidance Articles of Association for Domestically Listing Companies] (amended after passage of 
the 2006 Company Law by Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin [Guidance Articles of Association 
for Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, Mar. 16, 2006) zhengjiangongsizi [2006] 38, CSRC 
Laws and Regulations, at 938–948). See, e.g., Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas List-
ing Companies, supra, chapt. XIV, and art. 116 (with the pre-2006 proxy for fiduciary duties 
chengxin (“good faith”)), and in the Original Guidance Articles of Association for Domestically 
Listing Companies, chapt. V, and arts. 80 (mandating “loyalty” (zhongshi)) and 81 (mandating “pru-
dent” (jinshen), conscientious (renzhen), and diligent (qinmian) behavior by directors). 
 24. See, for example, the 2006 Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Industry Machinery Co. case 
opinions (Jingan District People’s Court, reversed on appeal by the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate 
People’s Court) summarized in Corporate Law in the Shanghai Courts, supra note 16, at 433–36. 
 25. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 26. See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Acquisi-
tions of Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, Dec. 1, 2002) zhengjianhuiling [2002] 10, 
available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=42687, art. 33 
(holding that the duty of target board, supervisory board members, and high-level management is to 
not harm the lawful rights and interests of the shareholders or the company), chapt. III (laying out 
the Van Gorkom type requirements describing the requisite duty of care applicable to the target 
board). After the effectiveness of China’s 2006 Company Law, these Measures were amended to 
track the explicit language for both duty of loyalty (zhongshi yiwu) and duty of care (qinmian yiwu). 
See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Acquisitions of 
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Finally, the CSRC injected corporate fiduciary duties into Chinese 
law not only for orthodox fiduciaries (directors, supervisory board mem-
bers, and management), but also for the most provocative actor in the 
PRC political economy: controlling shareholders (most often a corporate 
identity of the state or party).
27 For instance, the 2004 CSRC regulation 
described immediately below, which created negative veto rights for 
public shareholders as a body, holds explicitly that the controlling share-
holders and actual control parties of listed companies have fiduciary du-
ties to the listed company and the other shareholders of the listed compa-
ny. 28 
B. Protections for “Public Shareholders”and Quasi-Class                                                    
Negative Vetoes 
A strong example that embodies the incursion of securities regula-
tion directly into the heart of China’s corporate governance regime is the 
issuance in December 2004 of “Regulations Regarding Strengthening 
Protection of the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders,”29 which 
effectively re-defined public shareholders other than controlling share-
holders (whether holding listed or unlisted shares) as a kind of class and 
conferred upon that new quasi-class negative veto rights regarding cer-
tain decisions.
30 This constitutes a regulatory initiative far beyond mere 
exhortations to good and better governance at listed companies generally 
and directly determines shareholder constituencies and approval thresh-
olds designed to frustrate or check oppressive or conflicted majority ac-
                                                                                                                                        
Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, July 31, 2006) zhengjianhuiling [2006] 35, CSRC Laws 
and Regulations, at 845–853, art. 8 [hereinafter Listed Company Acquisition Rules]. 
 27. The not obvious doctrinal fact of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties was declared in 
the CSRC’s and State Economic Trade Commission’s 2002 Listed Company Governance Provisions 
(“Controlling shareholders have a fiduciary duty (chengxin yiwu) to the listed company and the other 
shareholders”). See Listed Company Governance Provisions, supra note 21, art. 19. 
 28. Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehuigongzheng Gudong Quanyi Baohu De Ruogan Guiding [Several 
Regulations Regarding Strengthening Protection for the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders] 
(promulgated by CSRC, Dec. 7, 2004) zhengjianfa [2004] 118, CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 
929–30, art. 5(1) [hereinafter Public Shareholder Protection Regulations] (declaring that control 
shareholders/parties have a chengxin zeren, the then-employed term of art expressing corporate 
fiduciary duties). 
 29. Id. 
 30. This negative veto is accomplished specifically by requiring that certain corporate actions 
be approved by both a majority of the general shareholders meeting and, in addition, a majority of 
the so-called “public shareholders” (shehui gongzhong gudong). The actions implicated include any 
new issuance of stock to the public or convertible debt, or any rights offering (other than where the 
control party promises to take up the entire offering in cash); major reorganization of the assets of 
the listed company; repayment of any debt to the company by a shareholder with company stock; 
any overseas listing by a significant subsidiary of the listed company; and “any matter that has a 
major effect on the rights and interests of the public shareholders.” See id. at art. 1(1)(i)–(v). 
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tion. For those familiar with U.S. corporate law and jurisprudence, these 
PRC securities regulatory agency norms require for Chinese listed com-
panies what is (i) commanded by state-level corporate statute or (ii) ar-
rived at via private ordering and only evaluated ex post by a state law 
court (e.g., Signal’s supermajority and majority of the minority offered 
in the roll-up merger of UOP evaluated by the Delaware Supreme Court 
in Weinberger).31 
C. Related Party Transactions and Self-Dealing; Controlling                      
Shareholders’ Duties 
When faced with a deficient 1994 company law statute weak on 
regulation of related party transactions and the abuse of listed subsidiar-
ies by controlling shareholders, the CSRC acted in 2003 and again in late 
2005 to institute corporate governance changes explicitly designed to 
address these problems. In 2003, the CSRC with the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (the latter a gov-
ernment department with very tenuous control over state-affiliated con-
trolling shareholders) issued a notice that addressed funds transfers by 
listed companies to their controlling shareholders and those shareholders’ 
affiliates, and listed company guarantees of the financial obligations of 
such controlling shareholders or those shareholders’ affiliates.32 The no-
tice prohibited certain funds transfers from the listed company to the 
controlling shareholders or their affiliates, and the provision of external 
guarantees by the listed company for the benefit of its controlling share-
holder or any 50% or more-owned subsidiaries of the latter.
33 The 2003 
notice limits the aggregate amount of external guarantees by a listed 
company to less than 50% of net assets (in the most recent fiscal year)
34 
and forbids guarantees for any debtor carrying excess leverage.
35
 What is 
most evocative in the present context is that the notice institutes (admit-
tedly weak) supermajority/direct shareholder approval requirements for 
all external guarantees—two-thirds of the board or mandatory general 
shareholders’ meeting approval.36 These are weak because the control-
ling shareholder in a PRC listed firm will control all or most of the direc-
                                                             
 31. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 32. Guanyu Guifan Shangshi Gongsi Yü Guanlianfang Zijin Wanglai Ji Shangshi Gongsi Dui-
wai Danbao Ruogan Wenti De Tongzhi [Notice Regarding Several Issues Relating to the Regulation 
of Listed Company-Related Party Funds Flows and Listed Company External Guarantees], Aug. 28, 
2003, zhengjianhui [2003] 56, CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 981–83. 
 33. Id. at arts. 1(2)(i)–(vi), 2(1). 
 34. Id. at art. 2(2). 
 35. Id. at art. 2(3). 
 36. Id.  
682 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:667 
tors and thus a required supermajority at the board level is no significant 
block—just as the controlling shareholder will use its majority voting 
power in the general shareholders’ meeting to assure the required share-
holders’ approval. These frailties were addressed, in part, with another 
CSRC notice issued only two years later, this time in tandem with the 
newly established China Banking Regulatory Commission.
37
 That jointly 
issued notice reasserts value limits on any guarantees but most critically 
mandates that company articles of association set forth explicitly the ap-
proval authority of the board with respect to external guarantees. The 
notice further requires supermajority (two-thirds) approval by the board 
of directors for guarantees within that approval authority or for external 
guarantees that must be submitted to the shareholders’ meeting, approval 
by the board (presumably a majority) and then majority approval by the 
shareholders but with the controlling shareholder and its affiliates not 
permitted to vote.38 Moreover, both the 2003 and 2005 notices create a 
kind of ad hoc veil-piercing mechanism (only recognized in PRC corpo-
rate law after January 1, 2006), providing for controlling shareholder 
joint and several liability on non-conforming external guarantees forced 
out of listed subsidiaries.
39 Implicit in each of these CSRC notices is the 
idea that controlling shareholders have some kind of fiduciary duty to 
their dominated (listed) firms, in particular the (minority) holders of the 
public float. This implication is consistent with the CSRC’s long cam-
paign to articulate fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders alluded to 
above.
40
 
D. Independent Directors 
In 2001, even after the PRC’s company law drafters embarked on a 
muddled experiment—really no more than a declaration of affiliation—
with German style “codetermination” and the establishment of a “super-
visory board” in addition to a U.S.-style board of directors at all Chinese 
companies, the CSRC instituted a conflicting system which mandated 
that after July 1, 2003 one-third of any listed company’s board must be 
composed of “independent directors.”41 While many analysts and market 
                                                             
 37. Guanyu Guifan Shangshi Gongsi Duiwai Danbao Xingwei De Tongzhi [Notice Regarding 
Regulation of the Provision of External Guarantees by Listed Companies], Nov. 14, 2005, 
zhengjianfa [2005] 120, CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 983–84. 
 38. Id. at art. 1(3)–(4). 
 39. Id. at art. 3l; Notice Regarding Several Issues Relating to the Regulation of Listed Compa-
ny-Related Party Funds Flows and Listed Company External Guarantees, supra note 32, at art. 4. 
 40. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Guanyu Zai Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Dulidongshi Zhidu De Zhidao Yijian [Guiding 
Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System], Aug. 16, 2001, zhengjianfa 
 
2014] “Quack Corporate Governance” As Traditional Chinese Medicine  683 
participants see the PRC’s independent director system as flawed as the 
two-tiered boards that now dot the Chinese corporate landscape, with the 
supervisory board either supine or serving as the convenient home for 
members of the firm’s (Communist) party committee,42 the fact remains 
that the independent directors override of Chinese-style codetermination 
came through a CSRC “guiding opinion” and formally non-binding 
CSRC corporate governance “principles,” yet absolutely enforced by the 
CSRC’s withholding of initial public offering or listing approvals for 
China-domiciled firms that did not conform. This is another example of 
the CSRC remaking basic corporate governance structures applicable to 
boards of directors entirely outside of the corporate law, or indeed “law” 
of any kind. 
E. Class Negative Veto Rights—Where Share                                   
“Classes” Are Prohibited 
In one of the most inventive expressions of the phenomenon assert-
ed here, the SCSC and CRES 1994 Mandatory Articles of Association 
for Overseas Listing Companies for PRC-domiciled firms issuing stock 
in Hong Kong or foreign markets were drafted to provide negative veto 
rights for certain class shareholders under a national corporate law that 
explicitly prohibited different classes of stock (and even preferred stock). 
This was effected by chapter IX of the Mandatory Articles of Associa-
tion, which declared shares held by foreign public buyers to be a share 
“type” (leibie)—not the legally prohibited term “class”—and required a 
two-thirds supermajority approval of the share “type” holders convened 
in a separate meeting for any resolution seeking to “change or eliminate 
type shareholders rights and interests” (a class/minority protection taken 
from the United Kingdom’s Companies Act-tradition affected class su-
                                                                                                                                        
[2001] 102, CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 924 –925. Independent directors were separately man-
dated in the CSRC’s later 2002 Listed Company Governance Provisions, supra note 21, chapt. III, 
§ 5, arts. 49–51. 
 42. See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006) (a structural and theoretical critique); Nancy Huyghebaert & Lihong 
Wang, Expropriation of Minority Investors in Chinese Listed Firms: The Role of Internal and Exter-
nal Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 20 CORP.GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 308 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Expropriation of Minority Investors]; Y. Cheung, L. Jing, T. Lu, R. Rau & A. Stouraitis, Tunnel-
ing and Propping Up: An Analysis of Related Party Transactions by Chinese Listed Companies, 17 
PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 372 (2009) [hereinafter Analysis of Related Party Transactions] (both showing 
empirically the ineffectiveness of independent directors in protecting minority shareholders in listed 
PRC firms). The independent director system has given rise to a raft of extremely difficult, and very 
basic, problems for everyone involved, e.g., who or what precisely do independent directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to—the listed firm, the general shareholders meeting, the general shareholders meet-
ing exclusive of the deemed controlling shareholders, or abstract notions of fairness and transparen-
cy, protection against minority shareholder oppression, or both? 
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permajority vote on “variation of class rights”).43 This mechanism has 
consistently empowered minority, foreign markets-purchasing, share-
holders in PRC-domiciled firms with Hong Kong or overseas listings, 
and in one case, ironically benefited the Chinese state-controlling share-
holder seeking to implement the forced consolidation of one of the 
PRC’s regional airlines and see off a competing (and target-preferred) 
bid by Singapore Airlines.
44
 
F. The 2007 “Articles for the Administration and Supervision of            
Listed Companies” 
The CSRC—and the corporate law academics aiding it in the initia-
tives revealed here—have not had complete success in re-making Chi-
na’s corporate law and corporate governance regime. We know, for in-
stance, that the CSRC failed in its behind-the-scenes attempt to change 
the company law directly, and have the 2006 PRC Company Law’s new 
veil-piercing provision set forth a lower standard for controlling share-
holder liability (focusing on controlling shareholder/controlled subsidiary 
separateness and comingling).
45
 
A second example shows much greater ambition on the part of the 
CSRC and its reform allies, which made the resulting failure (at least to 
the time of this writing) greater too. In late 2007, after the effectiveness 
of the 2006 PRC Company Law, the CSRC (with very significant input 
by China’s activist corporate governance academics)—acting through the 
PRC State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office—submitted to the PRC 
State Council for review, and released for public comment, a draft omni-
bus regulation (or tiaoli) titled, “Articles for the Administration and Su-
                                                             
 43. See Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas Listing Companies, supra note 23, 
chapt. IX, at CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 1002–03; Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, part. 17, chapt. 
9 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/17/chapter/9/crossheading/v 
ariation-of-class-rights. 
 44. See Barry Naughton, SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China, 24 CHINA 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1 (2007). The author, when a practicing lawyer, used the same mechanism to 
create substantial negative veto rights for the foreign private equity investor in its 25% private in-
vestment in Hainan Airlines Co., Ltd. which never had an overseas listing and thus was not required 
to have in place the Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas Listings Companies. As a self-
enforcing check on the oppressive actions of the controlling shareholders and their insiders, the 
mechanism proved near foolproof. 
 45. See Chao Xi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China—How Did We Get There?, 5 J. BUS. L. 
413, 423–27 (2011) (describing how the CSRC’s proposed statutory language would have allowed 
for piercing to controlling shareholders on a showing of non-separation between shareholder and 
subsidiary and/or co-mingling of assets, not just the higher—and more difficult to apply—standard 
of “abuse”). 
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pervision of Listed Companies,” which comprised 106 articles.46 Ex-
plained as an effort to rationalize all of the individual CSRC pronounce-
ments that had an impact on listed company corporate governance noted 
here into a single administrative regulation (and, explicitly, to conform 
Chinese listed company governance mandates with post-Enron SOX in-
novations in the United States), the draft regulation (i) asserts CSRC ju-
risdiction over all corporate governance matters at companies with shares 
listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges (in addition to securities 
issuance and trading matters, the traditional domain of a securities regu-
lator); and (ii) covers seemingly every base imaginable, including: 
 strict separation (financial, assets, personnel, management, 
business, etc.) between controlling shareholders and listed sub-
sidiaries 
 orthodox fiduciary duties; 
 board responsibility for monitoring officers and management 
(Caremark47 oversight duties); 
 SOX-style certification of periodic reports (and financial state-
ments therein) for directors, supervisory board members, and 
senior management; 
 the corporate fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders; 
 related party transactions (including a requirement that more 
than half of the independent directors approve major related 
party transactions); 
 external guarantees forced from listed subsidiaries and firm ap-
proval of the same; 
                                                             
 46. These draft regulations were released as the Shangshi Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Tiaoli 
(Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) [Articles for the Administration and Supervision of Listed Companies 
(Comment Draft)]; see supra note 1, and LIU JUNHAI, ZHONGGUO ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHI QIANYAN 
[RULE OF LAW FRONTIER FOR CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS] 164 (2012). The author has on file a 
copy of these draft Articles and the State Council Legislative Affairs Office’s accompanying expla-
nation (likely drafted by the CSRC and its academic advisors), and transcripts from the various 
hearings convened for comments. In 2003, a very similar effort was pushed by many of the same 
Chinese academics, but through the medium of an expert-drafted Supreme People’s Court “regula-
tion” (guiding), which would have substantially re-written the 1994 PRC Company Law to include 
many of the innovations seen in the 2006 PRC Company Law. See Guanyu Shenli Gongsi Jiufen 
Anjian Rugan Wenti De Guiding (Yi) (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) [Regulation Regarding Several Prob-
lems on Hearing Company Dispute Cases (One) (Comment Draft)] (promulgated by Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court, Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Omnibus Company Law Regulation], available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail/php?id=88551. The passage and promulgation of the 2006 
PRC Company Law in late 2005 effectively pre-empted the 2003 Omnibus Company Law Regula-
tion, carrying a great many of its innovations into law. 
 47. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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 maximum ratios of inside directors; 
 the independent directors system; 
 minimum ratios of independent directors on audit, compensa-
tion, and controls board committees; 
 a prohibition on directors delegating their vote to the chairman 
of the board; 
 limitations on directors’ consent in lieu of meeting; 
 the design and enforcement of mandatory articles of associa-
tion; 
 the general shareholders’ meeting and shareholder voting (in-
cluding proxy voting); 
 mandatory cumulative voting;  
 internal controls (and accountant certification of such controls); 
 limits on stock compensation;  
 the mandatory retention of outside corporate counsel; 
 investor relations; 
 post-issuance use of proceeds; 
 asset reorganizations; 
 prohibition on “financial assistance” in takeovers (taken from 
the U.K. Companies Act, which ironically largely abolished the 
prohibition after October 1, 2008); 
 procurement of a fairness opinion in any acquisition;  
 procedural remedies—such as a quasi-derivative action to allow 
shareholders to sue for rescission of illegal stock grants to di-
rectors and officers (which already exists for shareholders seek-
ing disgorgement of directors, supervisory board members, or 
senior management short swing trading profits under article 47 
of the 2006 PRC Securities Law);
48 and  
 more robust private rights of action (seeking explicitly author-
ized civil damages). 
 
If issued as a departmental regulation by the CSRC or an adminis-
trative regulation by the State Council, these Articles for the Administra-
tion and Supervision of Listed Companies would have completely and 
                                                             
 48. See Nicholas C. Howson, Punishing Possession—China’s All-Embracing Insider Trading 
Enforcement Regime, in INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 327, 330 (Stephen P. Bainbridge ed., 2013) 
(allowing shareholders to sue for disgorgement “acting in the company’s interest”). 
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fundamentally re-made the corporate and securities law applicable to 
companies with a public float on either of the Chinese exchanges, and 
every aspect of the corporate governance system binding on them. In-
deed, the CSRC-drafted Articles, if finally issued as a State Council reg-
ulation, would have created a second or addendum PRC Company Law 
by administrative regulation, not legislative act of the Chinese national 
legislature. As of this writing, this effort by the CSRC and its academic 
allies to do an end-around “law,” and re-craft corporate law via securities 
regulation, has failed. Nonetheless, it stands as a monument to the con-
tinuing ambition of China’s securities regulator (and those academics 
leading the effort) to use securities regulation to re-make every aspect of 
the corporate law in a more perfect image, and perhaps serves as a mark-
er for future efforts (or indeed explicitly “legal” amendments) under a 
future PRC government administration.
49
 And, of course, much of the 
substantive law and regulation contained in the never-promulgated 
CSRC Articles is already applied and enforced via the diverse enact-
ments noted here. 
G. The Fate of CSRC Securities Regulation-Based Reforms                     
in PRC Corporate Law 
The fate of the many corporate governance-related mandates actual-
ly instituted by the CSRC in the development of China’s corporate gov-
ernance model has been very good and includes (i) post facto absorption 
into corporate statute in whole or in part (“legalization”); and (ii) non-
absorption into Chinese corporate law but continuing effectiveness via 
the application and enforcement of PRC securities law and regulation 
(“continuing effectiveness but not legalization”). It might also include, 
theoretically at least, reversal or elimination by subsequent company law 
enactment (“elimination”). Examples of the legalization result abound, 
such as the provisions in the 2006 PRC Company Law which articulate 
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty for orthodox corporate fiduciar-
ies;
50 require recusal from board votes of conflicted directors;51 state in 
                                                             
 49. The author is aware that some of the key academics working on the Articles for the Admin-
istration and Supervision of Listed Companies (Comment Draft) had been invited in 2012 to leave 
their academic posts and work full time at the CSRC to push through such changes, deemed a neces-
sary step if the current merit review of issuances is to be ended. However, with the removal of the 
powerful reformer Guo Shuqing as chairman of the CSRC, and the transfer of Xiao Gang from the 
Bank of China to the CSRC chairmanship, this initiative may be terminated. See Chitra Somayaji, 
Xiao Quits Bank of China to Take Helm at Securities Watchdog, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2013, 1:27 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-17/xiao-quits-bank-of-china-to-succeed-guo-at-sec 
urities-regulator.html. 
 50. 2006 PRC Company Law, supra note 13, at art. 148. 
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law the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders (and thus provide a 
legal remedy for minority shareholder “oppression” or controlling share-
holder self-dealing);
52 require a cap on so-called external guarantees, 
recusal of controlling shareholders on shareholder votes for external 
guarantees, and a supermajority (2/3) vote for any external guarantee 
greater in value than 30% of corporate assets, or a majority of non-
controlling shareholders for any external guarantee;
53
 mandate a super-
majority shareholder vote (2/3) on the disposition of significant assets;
54 
and allow for different “classes” of shares.55 In some situations, the cor-
porate law is crafted so as to absorb preexisting CSRC-origin norms by 
simple backwards-looking statutory cross-reference. This is how, for ex-
ample, the mandatory independent directors system of 2001 is absorbed 
into Chinese corporate law post-2006—by a statutory mandate56 that 
there must be independent directors, in accordance with “State Council” 
(read “State Council commission”) issued norms, which in fact were al-
ready issued five years prior. The same is true for those corporate gov-
ernance norms that see continuing effectiveness but not legalization. One 
example in this realm is the entire machinery, rights (including benefit of 
a mandatory offer for target shareholders) and obligations (including tar-
get board fiduciary duties) brought into Chinese law with the introduc-
tion of the CSRC’s Listed Company Acquisition Rules—the 2006 PRC 
Company Law merely provides a legal basis for such transactions (espe-
cially a corporate merger) with nothing else.
57 Another example is the 
continuing effectiveness of the “type” (class) shareholders’ negative veto 
right on any corporate action, which affects the rights and interests of 
such “type” shareholders in PRC-domiciled firms listing on the Hong 
Kong or overseas markets.
58 On the theoretical “elimination” side, it is 
impossible for this observer to find even one example of a CSRC securi-
ties law-imposed corporate governance norm that has been eliminated or 
significantly carved back by a subsequent corporate law enactment. In-
deed, and now returning to the worried rhetoric of U.S. “quack corporate 
governance” theorists, the CSRC-led securities regulation reconstruction 
of China’s corporate law embodies the strongest form of “ratchet” imag-
                                                                                                                                        
 51. Id. at art. 125. 
 52. Id. at art. 20. 
 53. Id. at arts. 122, 16. 
 54. Id. at art. 122. 
 55. Id. at art. 127. 
 56. Id. at art. 123. 
 57. Id. at arts. 173–80. 
 58. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
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inable—it is wholly unidirectional and always results in permanent 
change in the parallel (and receiving) corporate legal system. 
IV. WHY CHINA AND THE CSRC HAVE TAKEN THIS APPROACH 
A. Administrative Law Competence 
Under the principles governing the contemporary Chinese legal sys-
tem, there is no question as to the legal authority of the CSRC to issue 
administrative regulations which impinge so directly upon what we may 
understand as corporate legal norms. The CSRC—as a “commission” 
directly under the PRC State Council—has the authority to issue “de-
partmental regulations” (“bumen guizhang” or just “guizhang” in the 
PRC legislative idiom). These regulations are a well recognized species 
of administrative rule-making for ministries and commissions like the 
CSRC under the PRC State Council and have a very solid legal basis in 
the 2000 PRC Law on Legislation
59
 insofar as they are issued publicly.
60 
Moreover, the CSRC has specifically delegated legal authority to make 
such departmental regulations regarding “the activities of securities issu-
ers and listed companies,”61 and there is nothing in the 2006 PRC Com-
pany Law or any other statute that forbids such regulation in the corpo-
rate governance sphere or appoints any other Chinese governmental in-
stitution as the primary or exclusive norm provider with respect to corpo-
rate law and governance. The only thing the CSRC cannot do, and here 
regardless of the subject of the regulation, is regulate or undertake en-
forcement outside of the bounds authorized for it in law.
62
 
B. “Corporatization Without Privatization” and Its Effects 
The far more revealing question is “why?” Why has the CSRC, 
alone and with other agencies, acted via administrative securities regula-
                                                             
 59. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [PRC Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), available at 
http://lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=386, arts. 71–77. I thus reject the (mostly aca-
demic) attacks against the CSRC’s authority to regulate on corporate governance matters (for listed 
companies) reported by Professor Clarke in 2003, infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 60. See PRC Law on Legislation, supra note 59, at arts. 61–62; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Zhengquan Fa [PRC Securities Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l. People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, 
effective Jan. 1, 2006), CSRC Laws and Regulations, at 3–16 [hereinafter 2006 PRC Securities 
Law], art. 184. 
 61. Id. at arts. 179(1), (3). 
 62. I have addressed this problem, specifically with respect to the enforcement of China’s 
narrowly crafted statutory insider trading prohibition by the CSRC and likely the People’s Procura-
torate, in Nicholas C. Howson, Enforcement Without Foundation?—Insider Trading and China’s 
Administrative Law Crisis, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 955 (2012). 
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tion to alter so significantly China’s corporate law and corporate govern-
ance regime, at least with respect to listed firms? The layered answer to 
that question promises important insights about the real political econo-
my of modern China, the nature of the firm post-“corporatization,” the 
most significant abuses visited on Chinese investors, the character of 
“law” in the PRC, and the relative competence, autonomy, and political 
independence of key political–legal institutions like the courts. 
Donald Clarke and I have tried to explain the “corporatization” 
program in the PRC and its consequences for both the nature of Chinese 
firms and the nature of corporate law in contemporary China.
63
 The tradi-
tional PRC state-owned enterprise––or literally “enterprise owned by all 
the people” (quanminsuoyouzhi qiye) (SOE)—was not what many inside 
and outside of China mistook it for: a legal corporation simply owned by 
a single shareholder, the state (on behalf of “all the people”). Instead, it 
was a division or ring-fencing of productive assets by a state administra-
tion, without granting separate legal personality or competence to that 
accumulation of assets, or any financial separateness (and thus accounta-
bility for profits, losses, or taxable gains) for it. It had party state-
appointed managers who moved through a bureaucratic hierarchy into 
progressively more powerful political positions. It did not issue owner-
ship interests in itself, like stock or equity. The “control” interest in such 
SOEs (the right to appoint management and appropriate gross revenues, 
and once a tax system came into being, net revenues or profits) was vest-
ed in some identity of the state—often central line ministries, but also 
subordinate units of the government such as local bureau of the same line 
ministries (e.g., the Hebei Provincial Bureau of Heavy Machinery) or 
local-level People’s governments (e.g., the Chongqing Municipal Peo-
ple’s Government). “Corporatization,” as commenced in the 1980s, con-
firmed along with the “modern enterprise system” in law with the 1994 
Company Law, and most recently expressed in the 2006 PRC Company 
Law, sought to implement a “modern enterprise system” and abolish the 
SOE as an organizational form64 by converting SOEs into a legal form 
                                                             
 63. See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder 
Protection—Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN 
ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 245–49 (Daniel Puchniak, Harald Baum 
& Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2012) [hereinafter Derivative Actions in the PRC] (which the follow-
ing paragraphs draw upon). 
 64. The SOE was not given a legal form until 1988 and the promulgation of a “law” governing 
SOEs, concurrent, ironically, with elimination of the SOE organizational form. See Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Quanmin Suoyouzhi Qiye Fa [Law of the PRC on Industrial Enterprises Owned 
by All of the People] (promulgated by the Nat’l. People’s Cong., effective Apr. 13, 1988), available 
at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=1188. 
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of “company” authorized and apparently governed by PRC company 
law: (i) a company limited by shares (CLS), a joint stock company form 
for widely held firms; (ii) a limited liability company (LLC), for a small-
er and closely knit group of investors; or (iii) a wholly state-owned sub-
form of the LLC (WSOC), a company owned by a state agency with no 
shareholders’ meeting and an optional board of directors. 
It is critical to understand that this process did not implicate “pri-
vatization” of the economy or SOEs, or any real withdrawal of the state 
(or the Communist Party behind the state) from the same, because a con-
trolling equity interest in the converted SOE went to or was maintained 
by state entities. To the present day, the party state remains absolutely 
committed to retaining control over converted enterprises in a very broad 
range of sectors—not just the usual suspects for state control (e.g., de-
fense, natural resources, infrastructure, etc.) but also non-national securi-
ty and non-key infrastructure sectors that are simply profitable to central 
or local state or party insiders when financed with the aid of (relatively) 
passive public investors. Moreover, while former administrative channels 
of control at SOEs may seem to have disappeared along with abolition of 
the SOE form, they in fact often continue to be effective just behind the 
scenes, completely subverting formal legal norms described in company 
law.
65
 
While this design for “corporatization without privatization” cou-
pled with maintenance of central or local state (and behind them, Com-
munist Party) control has impacted both closely held LLC firm estab-
lishments and widely held CLSs, it has had a very pronounced effect on 
the ownership, control, legal, and governance structures applicable to the 
PRC’s listed CLS issuers (whether listing inside China, in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, or abroad) and the disempower-
ment of those companies’ minority (public) widely dispersed sharehold-
ers. These patterns of control and equity ownership have very important 
implications for China’s corporate law and the corporate governance re-
gime as applied. 
First, the strong prevalence of concentrated ownership in Chinese 
companies (especially listed firms) means that the key agency problem 
for PRC corporate governance is not vertical (between management in-
                                                             
 65. See Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura Ac-
countability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123 (Martha Avery, Cai Jinqing & Zhu Min eds., 2009) (detail-
ing how party committees operated behind, and over, boards of directors at the PRC’s largest inter-
national issuers). 
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siders and a large body of disaggregated shareholders) but horizontal 
(between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders).
66
 
Second, the controlling shareholder and its insider appointees are 
not run-of-the-mill control parties/insiders, but most often are an identity 
of state or party organizations, representatives of central or local gov-
ernment institutions, or party nomenklatura appointments, giving them a 
heady mix of political and economic power, especially against disaggre-
gated, non-politically privileged, minority shareholders. This means that 
any attack against alleged misfeasance by such control parties—however 
carried, and employing whatever institution—will be difficult or at the 
very least politically sensitive. 
Third, the combination of a strong horizontal agency problem, and 
the nature of who and what the control parties are, means that China’s 
public companies have been run as vehicles to attract passive investment 
capital from information-deprived public investors entirely in the interest 
of those largely unaccountable controlling shareholders. The same firms 
have therefore represented a ready invitation to opportunism, “tunnel-
ing,” minority shareholder abuse and oppression, and outright fraud by 
the controlling shareholders and their appointed insiders—an invitation 
taken up with particular gusto at CLSs with a public float, subject to little 
monitoring by or accountability to a passive, politically disempowered 
and disaggregated shareholder interest and thoroughly compromised ju-
dicial enforcement institutions.
67
 A ready example of the problem, which 
does not rise to fraud or criminality, much addressed in the CSRC over-
lay of corporate governance regulation addressed herein, is the virtual 
habit of state-owned controlling shareholders of PRC listed companies 
directing those listed companies to give financial guarantees for the obli-
gations of other controlled subsidiaries of the controlling shareholder.
68
 
For the minority shareholders of the listed firm, this amounts to the coer-
cive imposition of unrelated risk on the shoulders of the listed firm for 
                                                             
 66. The same problem operates across the Taiwan Straits, in the Republic of China/Taiwan, 
and continues to elicit similar substantive law and institutional changes. See Christopher J. Guinello, 
The Revision of Taiwan’s Company Law: The Struggle Toward a Shareholder-Oriented Model in 
One Corner of East Asia, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 92 (2003). 
 67. See Analysis of Related Party Transactions, supra note 42; Expropriation of Minority 
Investors, supra note 42 (fraction of state ownership is positively associated with value-destroying 
related party transactions); H. Berkman, R. Cole & L. Fu, Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees 
to Related Parties, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 141 (2009) [hereinafter Expropriation Through Loan 
Guarantees] (loan guarantees issued by controlled listed firms to their controlling shareholders); G. 
Jiang, C. Lee & H. Yue, Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. FIN. 
ECON. 1 (2010) (widespread use of inter-corporate loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds 
from listed PRC firms). 
 68. See Expropriation of Minority Investors, supra note 42. 
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the benefit of the controlling shareholder (and usually a redirection of 
value away from the listed firm when the guaranty is called upon default 
of the affiliate debtor), and exclusive of any benefit to the listed firm or 
its public shareholders. In Anglo-American corporate law jurisprudential 
terms, this is classic “self-dealing” by the controlling shareholder, “op-
pression” of the non-controlling shareholder investors, or both. As can be 
readily understood, the controlling shareholders have the opportunity to 
implement these schemes both via opportunistic use of the corporate 
form twisted by the lopsided capital structure common under “corporati-
zation” and because of their rather significant political and economic 
power in the PRC context. 
Fourth and finally, this process of “corporatization without privati-
zation” has led to a very fundamental dilemma in the design and imple-
mentation (or not) of Chinese corporate governance and the legal struc-
ture supporting it.
69 The state continues to operate enterprises in China 
and exercise control in furtherance of its goals, which—good or bad70—
must be understood as distinct from the narrower shareholder wealth 
maximization goal of all other shareholders, i.e., the minority sharehold-
ers. (Admittedly, the goals of the state control party and the minority 
shareholders may converge from time to time, in particular with respect 
to short-term shareholder gains; however, there is nothing in the corpo-
ratization program, or law formal and applied, which requires that the 
state control party exercise its control in the service of wealth maximiza-
tion for all shareholders.) Thus the state, through its controlling share-
holders in corporatized entities, very openly exploits the minority share-
holders who have no other way to benefit from their investment in the 
corporatized firm. As long as Chinese ideology and national industrial 
policy continue to have state shareholders controlling corporate entities 
where there are any other shareholders, real protections for such minority 
shareholders present either (i) a constraint on the state’s ability to operate 
in a way that is the very reason the state has maintained control or (ii) if 
those constraints are not to operate on state-controlled firms, then the 
necessity for separate corporate law regimes applicable to state-
controlled corporatized firms, on one hand, and all other firms, on the 
                                                             
 69. See Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. 
REV. 494, 494–95 (2003) [hereinafter Corporate Governance in China]; Derivative Actions in the 
PRC, supra note 63, at 246–47. 
 70. The “goals” for which the state exercises its control rights can range from the assumed 
private interests of officials and cadres asked to represent “all of the people” of the state (much dis-
cussed in public governance literature) to various wider political or social imperatives (cross-
subsidization of failing firms, full employment, etc.), which seem more benign, but still operate to 
the detriment of external minority investors. 
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other hand. There is no immediate prospect of a formal, separate legal 
regime for state-controlled firms. Indeed, the 1994 PRC Company Law, 
the 2006 PRC Company Law, and the “modern enterprise system” and 
“corporatization” policies were all proclaimed as major steps in the op-
posite direction, eliminating any distinction between state firms and non-
state controlled companies. Instead, the history of non-implementation of 
China’s company law, especially to protect minority shareholders in pub-
lic capital markets financed and corporatized issuers, indicates recogni-
tion of—and push back against—the idea of any constraint on the state’s 
ability to operate investee firms in the way in which it desires; again, the 
reason for which it maintained control in the first place.
71
 
C. Legislative and Judicial Competence and Autonomy 
The concerns sketched out in the preceding paragraphs animated 
the wholesale reformation of the defective 1994 PRC Company Law into 
the form now effective as the 2006 PRC Company Law, which added 
substantive claims (e.g., duty of care, controlling shareholders’ fiduciary 
duties, piercing of the corporate veil, etc.) and procedural innovations 
(e.g., a derivative action, the ability of shareholders to call special share-
holders’ meetings, etc.), all designed to create or make more effective 
legal remedies for minority shareholders against politically powerful firm 
insiders and controlling shareholders. However, notwithstanding this 
constructive legislative policy and the real achievement that is the 2006 
PRC Company Law, at least three other factors were at work that re-
quired—and continue to require—sustained securities administrative 
agency involvement in corporate governance law/rule-making. 
First, there have been and remain serious issues pertaining to the 
technical competence of PRC legislators at the National People’s Con-
gress, especially with respect to more complex areas like corporate law. 
The 1994 Company Law, while rightfully hailed as China’s first post-
Communist Revolution company law, is a monument to bad, confused, 
and plainly incomprehensible drafting, especially when compared to the 
specialist agency-drafted CRES “opinions on standards” on CLSs and 
LLCs, which served as China’s corporate organizing statutes immediate-
                                                             
 71. See, e.g., Corporate Law in the Shanghai Courts, supra note 16, at 400–16; Derivative 
Actions in the PRC, supra note 63, at 254–56, 267–69, 275–78 (both noting the complete absence of 
widely-held or listed company governance-related shareholder company law-related suits—other 
than securities law claims alleging fraudulent or misleading disclosure pursuant to a very limited 
allowance made under pressure by the PRC Supreme People’s Court—in the Chinese courts, and the 
partially related hostility of the People’s Courts to any cases involving a large number of parties, 
resulting in large parts of the PRC Company Law remaining unimplemented). 
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ly prior to the promulgation and effectiveness of the 1994 law.
72 Moreo-
ver, it is apparent that the same powerful forces indicated here in the 
term “controlling shareholders” have worked vigorously to protect them-
selves or make the company “law” of China less protective of minority 
rights. Professor Xi Chao of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Law 
School has shown how during the drafting of the 2006 PRC Company 
Law, pressure was brought to bear (successfully) by SOEs and the state 
body responsible for state ownership positions in corporatized SOEs to 
substantially weaken the statutory basis for veil-piercing.
73
 
Second, while the situation is better than some observers surmise, 
there must be continuing doubts about the competence, autonomy, and 
political independence of PRC judicial institutions called upon to imple-
ment ex post corporate law standards or remedies.
74 In other words, even 
if state-of-the-art substantive provisions and procedural mechanisms are 
introduced into PRC company law—as they assuredly were in November 
2005 with the promulgation of the final 2006 PRC Company Law—there 
is a continuing concern as to whether the PRC People’s Courts will be 
competent and powerful enough to adjudicate, implement, and enforce 
such law with respect to any kind of PRC corporation, LLC, CLS, or 
WSOC, much less accept or be permitted to accept disputes concerning 
the same. This is a long-standing concern for transitional jurisdictions 
like the PRC, and an aspect that has justified advocacy by developed 
world corporate law theorists in favor of the design and implementation 
of “self-enforcing” company law,75 and the search for other non-legal 
institutions in China specifically that might support the heavy burden of 
                                                             
 72. See Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back—A 
Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 127 (1997). 
 73. See Xi, supra note 45, at 423–27 (describing the role of SASAC in sabotaging the CSRC’s 
more aggressive statutory veil-piercing proposal originally set forth in the Company Law Amend-
ment’s Consultation Draft, due to SASAC concern that the expanded doctrine would be applied to 
unlisted corporatized SOEs as well). 
 74. There is a voluminous and growing literature recounting corporate law adjudication in the 
Chinese People’s Courts. See, e.g., Corporate Law in the Shanghai Courts, supra note 16 (corporate 
law adjudication in the Shanghai Higher People’s Court system between 1992 and 2008); Wang Jun, 
Gongsi Jingyingzhe Zhongshi He Qinmian Yiwu Susong Yanjiu—Yi 14 Sheng, Zhixiashi De 137 Jian 
Panjueshu Wei Yangben [Analysis of Litigation Regarding Company Management’s Duties of Loy-
alty and Care—Using 137 Judgment Opinions from 14 Provinces and Directly Administered Munic-
ipalities], 5 BEIFANG FAXUE [NORTHERN JURISPRUDENCE] 24 (2011) (China) (corporate fiduciary 
litigation nationwide); Derivative Actions in the PRC, supra note 63 (the corporate derivative ac-
tion); Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where Is It Headed?, 
60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743 (2012) (corporate veil piercing). 
 75. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1914 (1996) (noting that in these types of jurisdictions, “company law that 
depends on fast and reliable judicial decisions is simply out of the question . . . .”). 
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enforcement of corporate governance norms by the judiciary and the 
CSRC.
76
 
I should note in passing that the PRC judicial bureaucracy (i.e., not 
courts issuing opinions on adjudicated cases) has played some role in 
implanting substantive corporate law doctrine and procedural innova-
tions into China’s corporate law and governance system. Before 2005, 
this was done via the creation by individual (Provincial/Directly Admin-
istered Municipality) Higher Level People’s Court systems of “opinions” 
on issues presented in litigation concerning the woefully deficient 1994 
PRC Company Law.
77
 In many cases, these “opinions” (some entirely 
internal and non-public) read like detailed, revised company law statutes 
and are the primary source of critical corporate law claims and procedur-
al architectures such as the derivative action, a shareholder oppression 
claim, piercing of the corporate veil, invalidation of directors’ or share-
holders’ resolutions, settlement restrictions, etc. (none of which had a 
legal basis in the then-effective 1994 PRC Company Law).
78 Important-
ly, none of these local court system opinions attempted to institute self-
enforcing governance mechanisms like supermajority negative veto 
rights, as one example, in the style the CSRC has for public companies. 
After the effectiveness of the 2006 PRC Company Law, the Supreme 
People’s Court has released three judicial “regulations” concerning the 
company statute and has embarked on a “guiding cases” project, none of 
                                                             
 76. See Donald C. Clarke, The Role of Non-Legal Institutions in Chinese Corporate Govern-
ance, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 168 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-sik Kim 
& Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2008) (analyzing the role played by markets, including the stock markets; 
commercial banks; asset management companies, that purchased bad debt from China’s commercial 
banks; independent directors; the supervisory board; controlling (state) shareholders; compensation; 
gatekeepers for the public markets, principally lawyers and accountants; and the financial press). 
 77. See, for example, such detailed opinions issued by the Jiangsu Province Higher People’s 
Court, Guanyu Shenli Shiyong Gongsifa Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Yijian (Shixing) [Opinions on 
Several Issues on Adjudicating Cases Applying Company Law (Trial Implementation)] (June 2003), 
in GONGSIFA YINAN WENTI JIEXI (DI SAN BAN) [COMPANY LAW ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS 
(3RD EDITION)] 240–48 (Shanghai Higher People’s Court ed., 2006) (China); the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court (No. 2 Civil Division), Guanyu Shenli Sheji Gongsi Susong Anjian Ruogan Wenti 
De Chuli Yijian (Yi) [Opinions on Adjudicating Cases Regarding Corporate Litigation (One)], id. at 
231–36 (2003) (China); and the Beijing Higher People’s Court, Guanyu Shenli Gongsi Jiufen Anjian 
Ruogan Wenti De Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) [Guiding Opinion on Several Issues on Adjudicating 
Corporate Dispute Cases (Trial Implementation)], id. at 236–40 (Feb. 2004) (China). 
 78. A group of PRC legal academics tried to hijack this process, but from the apex of the na-
tional judicial bureaucracy or the Supreme People’s Court, with the drafting and submission for 
approval of the 2003 Omnibus Company Law Regulation, supra note 46, which attempted to rewrite 
the 1994 Company Law in its entirety. That effort was preempted by the passage of the 2006 PRC 
Company Law, which tracked many of the wholesale changes attempted through the Omnibus Com-
pany Law Regulation (e.g., derivative actions, corporate fiduciary duties, and specifically a duty of 
care, etc.). 
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which, however, remake corporate governance norms in the same fash-
ion as the CSRC regulation described here.
79
 
Third, is one result of the basic dilemma in China’s corporate gov-
ernance project described above, the almost complete non-
implementation of China’s company law for minority shareholders in 
public capital markets-financed corporatized issuers, arising from the 
system’s denial of any constraint on the state’s ability to operate public-
invested investee firms in the way in which it desires, the reason for 
which it maintained control in the first place.
80
 
D. The CSRC and the Continuing Utility of Self-Enforcing                      
Governance Norms 
Each of the above-described factors have worked together to leave 
the CSRC as one of the only state institutions in China capable of the 
following: (i) expert drafting of substantive provisions, in particular of 
the self-enforcing type; (ii) technical resistance against controlling state 
shareholders (and the political–economic systems backing them); (iii) 
substituting for an inexpert, overly bureaucratic, or politically cowed ju-
diciary; and (iv) seeing to the institution of corporate governance norms 
to protect minority shareholders against exploitation by state controlling 
shareholders (in a context where there is empirical support for the idea 
that traditional internal and external corporate governance constraints are 
not effective),
81
 at least with respect to PRC companies explicitly under 
the CSRC’s jurisdiction—firms issuing publicly traded securities. Using 
                                                             
 79. See ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYÜ GONGSIFA SIFAJIESHI (YI), (ER) LIJEI YÜ SHIYONG 
[SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ON USE AND UNDERSTANDING OF COMPANY LAW JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS ONE AND TWO] 3, 7–11 (Xi Xiaoming ed., 2006) (China) for the first and second 
Judicial Regulations on the Company Law (concerning how the People’s Courts should handle ac-
tions that straddle January 1, 2006, and on shareholder petitions for judicial dissolution, respective-
ly). The third Judicial Regulation, issued and effective February 16, 2011, and concerning various 
issues including promoters’ pre-incorporation liability, defective capital contributions, the rights of 
shareholders who have not completed or who have made defective capital contributions, and “trust” 
arrangements between record shareholders and beneficial interest shareholders, is available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201102/t20110216_13851.htm. The “Guiding Cases” initiative 
was commenced in November 2010 by the Supreme People’s Court, and a group at the Stanford 
Law School Library is working to translate such cases as they are issued, which can be accessed at 
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/. To date, only one of such Guiding Cases has involved 
corporate governance matters. “Guiding Case No. 10” (Li Jianjun v. Shanghai Jiapower Environ-
mental Protection Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (Final Version, Nov. 9, 2012)) available at 
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CGCP-Chinese-Guiding-Case-10.pdf 
(shareholder challenge to a board resolution). 
 80. See supra notes 69–71 and acommpanying text. 
 81. See Expropriation of Minority Investors, supra note 42 (analyzing ownership structure, 
board of directors, external legal environment, and stock markets, including public information 
flow). 
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its jurisdiction over the operation and governance of securities issuers 
with listed stock, and faithful to its mission to protect at least the appear-
ance of a level-ish playing field for China’s capital markets (to continue 
to attract the participation of private capital), the CSRC has been the 
primary, and best, workshop for expert substantive corporate governance 
provisions designed to resist incumbent state control parties, and in ways 
that avoid the risks of non-enforcement by an overmatched judiciary.
82
 
As I have noted above, however, the CSRC and other bureaucracies 
have instituted corporate governance norms along two distinct pathways: 
(i) the filling-in of substantive corporate law doctrines, which must still 
be enforced by a state actor (e.g., the judiciary or a regulator); and (ii) the 
establishment of “self-enforcing” mechanisms, which can be effective 
(e.g., at the general shareholders’ meeting) without immediate recourse 
to enforcement by any external institution. I should emphasize, then, that 
the sub-strain of CSRC action described herein which pertains to the fill-
ing-in of major doctrinal aspects of China’s substantive corporate law is 
not responsive to the major justifications for CSRC involvement listed 
above. For example, if a public authority like the CSRC is concerned 
about the political and economic power of controlling shareholders or 
has doubts about the competence, autonomy, and independence of the 
Chinese judiciary, the implantation of substantive corporate fiduciary 
duties (or controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties) into China’s com-
pany law alone is not responsive to the problem (as effective articulation 
and enforcement of these norms will be deferred or frustrated by the re-
sisting forces apparently animating the reform in the first place). Clearly, 
the CSRC, as an expert agency, has pursued these doctrinal initiatives to 
fill unconscionable voids in China’s developing corporate law and com-
municate something about the governance, and monitoring, of PRC-
domiciled firms issuing stock both domestically and internationally (e.g., 
the absorption of the entire body of Hong Kong, and English, fiduciary 
duties law in 1993 in conjunction with China’s first listings “overseas” in 
pre-Handover Hong Kong).
83
 
Conversely, those CSRC initiatives which are “self-enforcing” are 
directly responsive to the full menu of issues/forces listed above, with 
much greater promise of effectiveness. For instance, the negative veto 
                                                             
 82. For more than a decade, domestic and foreign analysts have discussed the potential positive 
corporate governance effects of increased investment in Chinese listed companies by (controlling 
shareholder) unaffiliated institutional investors. It is still too early to understand the corporate gov-
ernance effect, positive or negative, of such investors’ participation should it become more preva-
lent, yet we can say with certainty that at present, the role of such investors pales in comparison to 
what the CSRC can do via the regulation described here. 
 83. See supra note 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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rights created for approval of related party “external” guarantees consti-
tute a very effective response to the identified abuse, especially when 
compared to reliance on the doctrinal fill-in, a vague and unevenly ap-
plied duty of loyalty standard applied ex post. Of course, academic ana-
lysts will question the viability of a self-enforcing design for China’s 
corporate law, given the spectacular demise of a highly touted and U.S. 
legal academic-directed Russian experiment and the broad recognition 
that even (initially) self-enforcing norms may have to be enforced (sub-
sequently) by the state when firm participants do not comply with the 
allegedly self-enforcing rules.
84 In response, I can only invoke my dec-
ades-long experience as a corporate law practitioner in the PRC to assert 
that self-enforcing mechanisms—like negative vetoes or super-majority 
approval rights—do work in China presently and are extremely effective 
at constraining autocratic and politically endowed controlling sharehold-
ers regardless of how they seek to implement that control through the 
board of directors or the general shareholders’ meeting. Moreover, to the 
extent such mechanisms do function, that compliance is not reported and 
thus cannot be observed or quantified; only brazen non-compliance by 
firm participants will become apparent (via litigation or the financial 
press), and there is very little evidence of that—all of which tends to con-
firm my personal observations of how well self-enforcing norms function 
in China. 
V. ENABLING TO MANDATORY—THE STATE QUA REGULATOR BATTLES 
THE STATE QUA SHAREHOLDER 
A. The U.S.-Origin Quack Corporate Governance Critiques and the PRC 
This Article begins with a précis listing of the several critiques 
launched against SOX and Dodd–Frank-imposed “quack corporate gov-
ernance.” Many of those attacks do not apply directly to the equivalent 
regulatory phenomenon seen in the PRC and detailed here given China’s 
unitary national government and national corporate law (e.g., the U.S.-
specific “state jurisdiction” and “legal systems market/laboratories of 
federalism” critiques—there is in fact no market for corporate law in the 
PRC).
85 Others of the attacks do not track well onto the PRC’s still de-
                                                             
 84. See Bernard Black, Reinier H. Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and 
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000). 
 85. As Jennifer Hill sensibly points out, the Romano/Bainbridge “legal systems mar-
ket/laboratories of federalism” critique may not apply even in avowedly federal nations with state-
level corporate law. See Jennifer Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statu-
tory Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 820 n.9 (2008) (“Although Australia technically has a state-
based system of corporate law, the Corporations Act 2001 effectively operates as a ‘federal’ rule as a 
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veloping institutional structures (e.g., the “bad, panicked, uninformed, 
badly-informed and inexpert legislative process” or “opportunistic pack-
aging of spurious preventatives” critiques—CSRC reforms are a remedy 
to a dysfunctional, inexpert, and often manipulated legislative process, 
and there is no harm in an institution like the expert CSRC acting strate-
gically to implement critically needed corporate governance protections 
when the national legislature cannot, will not, or does not have the re-
quired technical competence). 
There are, however, other aspects of the U.S.-origin complaint 
against a securities regulation incursion into the corporate law domain 
that do sound in the PRC circumstance. Certain of these PRC-relevant 
U.S.-style critiques can be answered by pointing to the Chinese political 
economy in which PRC firms operate. For instance, unfettered “director 
primacy” in China may not be a “good,” but instead an evil that must be 
restrained at corporatized SOEs majority owned by state-owned control-
ling shareholders, which elect most of the directors on a given board, and 
the judicially applied fiduciary duty constraint is weak. The same might 
be said for the “choice of regulatory approach cost” and “empirical stud-
ies demonstrates ineffectiveness” critiques, as there may be reason to 
think that a public-spirited regulator like the CSRC should be in the 
business of erecting additional costs in the face of overly powerful state-
tied controlling shareholders and their insiders. (There is a longer rebut-
tal to the latter of these critiques, which goes to how one measures “ef-
fectiveness” in analyzing corporate governance reforms—said another 
way, whether such effectiveness should be entirely based on measured 
firm value or market cap, profitability, or decision-making efficiency, as 
contrasted with enhanced protection of, and accountability to, minority 
owners by the erection of obstacles like super-majority voting rights, 
negative vetoes, etc.) Similarly, the “cost of new compliance/cost com-
pliance,” “unattractive to (domestic and foreign) securities issuers,” and 
“transnational effect” critiques may all be inappropriate for the PRC cir-
cumstance, as the corporate governance provisions analyzed in this Arti-
cle may serve to increase investor confidence (PRC and foreign) regard-
ing China and make PRC issuers only more attractive to the providers of 
investment through the capital markets. 
                                                                                                                                        
result of reference by each state of its powers relating to corporations to the federal government. 
This broad referral of powers by the states to the federal government constituted an attempt to unify 
and harmonize corporate law rules in Australia. . . . Thus, whereas state competition has been 
viewed as an essential contributor to efficiency in the U.S. corporate law, in the Australian context, it 
was considered an obstacle to efficiency.”). 
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B. “Distinct Legal Systems” and Corporate Law with                         
Chinese Characteristics 
Perhaps most interesting and revealing of the nature of both corpo-
rate law and governed firms in contemporary China is the critique I as-
sert above that U.S. law academics pay too little attention to
86—what I 
call the “distinct legal systems” critique (coupled with the expressed fear 
of a unidirectional “ratchet” effect). 
In the Anglo-American legal system, corporate law has changed 
significantly over more than 150 years. Corporate law commenced with 
special legislative chartering of state-promoted, partially or wholly pri-
vately financed, firms engaging in quasi-public activities under mandato-
ry and often immutable rules (e.g., regional monopoly trading compa-
nies, railway and canal-building firms, etc.). Today, we observe general 
corporation codes which are enabling in orientation, providing something 
like a standard form contract structured around default provisions with 
very few mandatory or immutable rules working on firm participants’ 
internal rights and obligations or the firm’s external activities. Indeed, 
corporate law is now determined by a mixed application of some default 
provisions left unchanged by the participants, specific arrangements 
crafted by ex ante contracting-out of other default rules, and extremely 
broad common law doctrines interpreted and enforced ex post by a usual-
ly circumspect (and business judgment rule-constrained) judiciary as 
prodded by private shareholder plaintiffs (and in the United States, their 
attorneys working with the benefit of contingency fee arrangements and 
liberal cost-sharing/class action rules). Basic theories of the corporation 
have developed in parallel from the eighteenth and
 
nineteenth century 
idea that firms were a creation of the state, to the
 
twentieth century “con-
tractarian” conception of the company as a creation of private contract. 
Securities law and regulation can be seen as substantially different 
from modern corporate law. Securities law is almost wholly built on im-
mutable and mandatory rules (e.g., disclosure) or prohibitions (e.g., 
against insider trading or securities trading manipulation), with an expert 
administering agency and the courts left to interpret and enforce the 
                                                             
 86. Roberta Romano implies the distinction I draw here—but goes no further—when offering a 
way to rescind the mandates she calls “quack corporate governance,” by suggesting (in her more 
moderate remedy) that what is mandatory be transformed into the default: 
The easiest mechanism for operationalizing such a policy change [rescinding the offend-
ing SOX mandates] would be to make the SOX mandates optional, i.e., statutory default 
rules that firms could choose whether to adopt. . . . Were the SOX corporate governance 
mandates to be treated as defaults, corporations would be able to opt out by shareholder 
vote. 
Romano, supra note 2, at 1594–95. 
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meaning or reach of those rules/prohibitions alongside private sharehold-
er plaintiffs. Indeed, securities law rarely functions to “enable” and de-
fers very little to private arrangements or any notion of ex ante contract-
ing out of its strong norms, precisely because to be effective it must be 
mandatory and immutable. 
For many analysts, it is the enabling standard form contract and de-
fault rule-providing—and non-mandatory—character of corporate law 
that both defines and recommends it. Indeed, I believe that one thing an-
imating the “quack corporate governance” critique in the United States 
(and aside from the ideological “legal systems market/laboratories of 
federalism” critique) is related to the notion that a corporate establish-
ment and governance system predicated on private contracting in the 
embrace of well understood and mostly majoritarian default rules must 
be protected at all costs and against the imposition of mandatory rules 
that constrain the space for private agreement or alter the mutability of 
state-offered default prods. Why this keen concern about mandatory pro-
visions? In my view, it arises from a bedrock confidence in developed 
economies that capital accumulates (i.e., it is invested by private parties) 
and will be efficiently allocated to useful projects, through an infinite 
variety of complex and often shifting arrangements regarding entity gov-
ernance and investor rights (with respect to both firm governance and 
value recognition), which arrangements are in turn determined by differ-
ent levels of information availability, the value (both cash and know-
how) brought to the table by specific investors, and innumerable other 
factors. Said another way, there is a strong belief that any attempt to sig-
nificantly pattern or constrain those arrangements (and beyond what the 
public interest or basic accountability absolutely requires) will impede 
realization of the best, privately negotiated, arrangements and thus fatally 
dampen capital formation.
87 (Whether or not this is true as a general mat-
ter for all investors, which I doubt, it has to be true for the most powerful 
and sophisticated venture investors, who have the knowledge and bar-
gaining leverage to ask for and achieve specific, self-interested invest-
ment and governance terms.) An offshoot of this line of thinking, and 
especially strong in the United States with its resurgent libertarian tradi-
tion, is the concern that recoils at the thought of too much intervention by 
the state or any other external player into the “self-ordered” or “private” 
realm, or “free” action. 
                                                             
 87. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 685, 688 (2009) (“Corporate law came to be enabling rather than directory in the United States 
because that serves investors’ interest, not because it serves managers’ interest. States that adopt 
inefficient regulation propel capital out of their jurisdictions.”). 
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None of the above is meant to deny that, even in developed world 
economies, there are areas where these two distinct legal systems must 
converge on the same object of affection: the large widely held corpora-
tion with listed shares.
88 This limited convergence occurs because share-
holders (and potential shareholders) of large public firms experience the 
most extreme kind of information asymmetry, and thus mandatory dis-
closure (and some mandatory process) is imposed via securities regula-
tion to redress a pernicious imbalance, force standardized information 
disclosure that might not occur if disclosure was voluntary,
89
 and not in-
cidentally maintain the attractiveness of public capital markets, which are 
in turn critical to capital formation. Examples of this quite appropriate 
incursion of securities regulation-origin mandatory rules into the normal-
ly more contractually determined corporate law realm can be seen with 
respect to the shareholder voting process (proxy solicitations and the real 
shareholders’ meeting), existential decision making by shareholders 
(tender offers), and breach of fiduciary duties by public securities trading 
where a deep market and anonymous trading in that market give rise to 
an information asymmetry that is complete and otherwise without reme-
dy (insider trading). 
So, how does the contemporary Chinese accommodation highlight-
ed in this Article fit into this discourse about two legal systems: contrac-
tarian-friendly/enabling corporate law versus mandatory securities law 
                                                             
 88. Indeed, there are major Anglo-American tradition jurisdictions that have abandoned any 
real distinction between corporate law and securities law norm vehicles, such as Australia, where 
both corporate law and securities law are embodied in the same piece of legislation, some items of 
corporate law are mandatory and some items of securities law are at least permissive (but not ena-
bling), such as the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) corporate governance-related “comply or 
explain” rules, which also feature in the Dodd–Frank statute, supra note 5. Professor Hill explores 
some of this, and in particular how much more protection institutional shareholders in News Corp. 
enjoyed under mandatory Australian corporate/securities law in the Australian Corporations Act and 
the ASX Listing Rules (regarding norms delivered by the Listing Rules, and relating to super-voting 
shares, shareholders’ meetings and voting, takeovers, and best practices principles) than under ena-
bling Delaware corporate law, U.S. securities law, and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) regula-
tion before News Corp.’s shift of domicile to Delaware and its primary listing to the NYSE in her 
contra-convergence study. Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholders Rights: Lessons from News 
Corp.’s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 89. There is, of course, a very rich and long-standing debate about whether mandatory stand-
ardized disclosure is desirable or necessary given the incentives, which might support purely volun-
tary disclosure by issuers. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Meritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securi-
ties Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). I do 
not engage with that interesting debate here, other than to note that the normative cases with respect 
to mandatory or voluntary disclosure in the PRC capital markets have to take account of China’s 
specific institutional context and political economy, which are radically different from the landscape 
over which these interesting battles have been fought for so many years. 
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(which I emphasize is distinct from the overarching U.S.-specific preoc-
cupation with state corporate law and federal securities law)? For many 
of the reasons highlighted here, in 1993–1994 the Chinese Communist 
Party-led government began its experiment with company law making 
decidedly in the “mandatory” and not the “enabling” mode.90 Indeed, that 
orientation was but a continuation of China’s earliest, from the late Qing 
to 1949, identities of corporate law specifically,
91
 and law generally.
92 
All of that in turn is consistent with the Chinese state’s (and before that, 
the imperial Chinese court’s) desire to control or monitor very closely 
potentially independent capital accumulation and business activity, and 
benefit from it.
93
 Only with the passage of the 2006 PRC Company Law 
did China move—formally at least—away from a business regulation 
philosophy and in a new direction: towards an enabling statute that al-
lows for increasing private contracting-out of default rules ex ante along-
side continuing self-enforcing mechanisms, and which creates very sig-
nificant work for the judiciary applying standards (like fiduciary duties) 
ex post. In fact, this development in the direction of a formally “ena-
bling” corporate law system and away from a directive, business regula-
tion and orientation has been celebrated widely in the PRC among aca-
demics and People’s Court officials alike. For example, a 2007 commen-
tary on a 2003 case (where the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s 
Court had to choose between statutory rights of first refusal due to exist-
ing shareholders and the rights of a good faith purchaser under a fraudu-
lently approved securities purchase contract) by the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court channels Frank Easterbrook directly: 
                                                             
 90. See Corporate Governance in China, supra note 69, at 496, 500 (“And the [1994] Compa-
ny Law is thus clearly more concerned with regulating and suppressing than with fostering and nur-
turing. . . . The policy choice in the current [1994] Company Law is clear: the rules are almost uni-
formly mandatory.”). 
 91. See William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company law and Business Enterprise in 
Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995). 
 92. See Liang Zhiping, Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and West-
ern legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55, 61, 89 (1989) (“Prohibitions and commands emphasize the 
function of law; punishment, however, is primarily the means by which realization of this function is 
guaranteed. . . . Law was never perceived as a means of preserving rights, freedom, justice, since 
these were completely alien concepts in ancient China. Law was punishment . . . [a]ccording to 
traditional ideas, law was above all a tool of suppression. It was also one of countless methods of 
governing, which could be used and constituted at will by the ruler.”). 
 93. See Kirby, supra note 91, at 44 (“The history of this first modern Chinese [company law] is 
to some degree a barometer of the state’s assumptions towards the economy over the course of the 
twentieth century. . . . [T]he Chinese state would be the prime beneficiary of the adoption of the 
corporate form of business activity. But the first assumption of the [early twentieth century] Qing 
reformers, that the modern corporation on a Western model would be the essential vehicle for pri-
vate Chinese economic development, would prove quite mistaken.”); Madeleine Zelin, The Firm in 
Early Modern China, 71 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 623 (2009). 
2014] “Quack Corporate Governance” As Traditional Chinese Medicine  705 
First and foremost, the thing we must clarify is this: the jurispruden-
tial logic underlying the giving of priority to the [right of first re-
fusal] over the purchase rights of the transferee is absolutely not be-
cause the former right is in statute and the latter is merely a contrac-
tual right. This is because statutory rights are not always superior to 
contractual rights—in fact, it is just the opposite. Approaching it 
systematically and adhering to the orientation which protects pri-
vate ordering, regulation of the market requires that application of 
the law fully respect the freedom to contract to encourage success-
ful transactions. . . . There is significant meaning in this.
94
 
(At the same time, the close proximity in time of China’s corporate gov-
ernance system to a strong business-regulation orientation makes the dis-
tance between the CSRC mandatory norms described here and increas-
ingly enabling corporate law much less, certainly as compared with the 
same leap that the SEC or U.S. Exchanges attempt to perform—not just 
across the borders of law, but also federal and state jurisdictional lines.) 
But herein lies the rub: as China’s corporate law has moved in one 
direction, the mandatory norms imposed by the CSRC and other agencies 
described in this Article have pushed the applied law of corporate gov-
ernance in precisely the opposite direction.
95 The reasons for this admin-
istrative agency counter-strike (and incursion into a notionally separate 
domain of law and regulation) are clear and once again reveal in stark 
terms the very real political economy of China and its corporatized 
SOEs. Describing modern PRC company law as “enabling” appropriate-
ly conjures another use of that term, something like the “enabling” of a 
drug addict or mafia chief acting in furtherance of a recognized public or 
social evil. Given lopsided capital structures and the dominant horizontal 
agency concern (and horizontal oppression) described above, the uncon-
strained power of state controlling shareholders (and their appointed in-
siders), and a radical information asymmetry between such controlling 
shareholders and public (both retail and even institutional) capital pro-
viders, an enabling company law design in China is in fact a wide invita-
tion for dominant shareholders to oppress and disadvantage far weaker 
                                                             
 94. Commentary regarding the case reported as “A Investment Company v. Wang and Other 
Shareholders,”(Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, on appeal 2003), in 2005 NIAN 
SHANGHAI ANLI JINGXUAN [2005 SELECTION OF SHANGHAI COURT CASES] 106–109 (Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court, ed. 2007) (with the quoted portion of the commentary id. at 111 (emphasis 
added)). 
 95. Interestingly, my own research has shown how the Chinese People’s Courts—contrary to 
some expectations and certainly the doctrinal rhetoric quoted from the Investment Company v. Wang 
case commentary above—have mimicked this trajectory, adjudicating some enabling provisions of 
the 1994 and 2006 PRC Company Laws as mandatory. See Corporate Law in the Shanghai Courts, 
supra note 16, at 382–83 (“‘Conservative’ Adjudication – iii. Enabling to Mandatory”). 
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actors in the firm, especially where minority shareholders have very little 
power to bargain for effective protections or obtain any price discount to 
reflect their disadvantageous position. Therefore, mandatory provisions 
designed to protect, even minimally, the basic rights of minority capital 
providers against such control parties are mandatory. 
A decade ago one of the best observers of corporate governance de-
velopments in China, Don Clarke, was not sanguine about the role the 
CSRC might play in supporting better and more effective corporate gov-
ernance in China. His concerns properly focused on resource constraints 
at the CSRC (already fully occupied with market regulatory tasks, merit 
regulation for issuers, and patrolling disclosure into the capital markets) 
and its basic legal authority to intervene in the corporate law sphere: 
The prime candidate here [as an institution able to play a role in 
corporate governance reform] would seem to be the . . . CSRC; 
however, it is hampered by significant disabilities. First, its staff is 
small relative to the scale of its tasks. . . . The CSRC . . . must en-
force merit requirements that attempt to ensure the investment 
quality of the business as well as disclosure requirements. Moreo-
ver, its very authority to make and enforce rules regarding corporate 
governance has been challenged as insufficiently grounded in legis-
lation. So far the challenge has been only academic, but at some 
point a suitably motivated court might agree.
96
 
Professor Clarke then went on to question the viability of the CSRC ad-
vocating for substantive corporate law doctrine like fiduciary duties, or 
participating in a meaningful way in their enforcement: 
It is very unlikely that the CSRC, which does not even have the sta-
tus of a regular government administrative agency, can by itself cre-
ate a private right of action for shareholders against directors. It has 
engaged in a limited number of disciplinary actions against direc-
tors, but any norm that relies solely on administrative enforcement 
is going to be of limited value, given the CSRC’s resource con-
straints.
97
 
The answer to those concerns lie in what Professor Clarke uncharacteris-
tically failed to imagine a decade ago: (i) for the CSRC, virtually costless 
(or non-resource depleting) corporate governance reform mechanisms, 
i.e., self-enforcing norms (e.g., class supermajority voting rights and su-
permajority of the non-controlling shareholder group votes, etc.) and 
structural reforms that enhance firm monitoring but implicate only firm-
                                                             
 96. Corporate Governance in China, supra note 69, at 504 (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. 
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level costs (e.g., independent directors); (ii) a revised 2006 Company 
Law that now fully incorporates a good number of the substantive legal 
doctrines and procedural mechanisms/private rights of action the CSRC 
and its academic allies have long tried to sell into the body of China’s 
corporate law (e.g., fiduciary duties for orthodox corporate fiduciaries 
and even controlling shareholders, the derivative action, etc.); and (iii) a 
constantly developing judiciary that is increasingly effective in enforcing 
these key legal doctrines, exclusively CSRC-origin corporate governance 
norms, or both. 
C. Regulatory Expansion of Private Autonomy in the Statist                
Political Economy 
Outside of Professor Clarke’s well informed but ultimately unreal-
ized worries about the effectiveness of CSRC-led and instituted regulato-
ry reform of Chinese corporate governance, other observers—especially 
those in the West—may have a separate, more philosophical, concern 
with the practices revealed here, that being alarm at profound “state” in-
cursion into a realm of “private freedom.” As noted above, I believe this 
largely philosophical concern fans some of the more strident “quack cor-
porate governance” attacks in the United States. Surely that concern, di-
rected at governance structures in a liberal democracy like the United 
States, only has greater purchase when focused on a largely authoritarian 
political system like the PRC. 
For China, however, as we fill in the specific PRC context, we are 
called upon to reappraise what may be called the “spheres of freedom” 
concern and understand that our worries may be completely backwards. 
Indeed, an understanding of the CSRC’s impact on China’s corporate 
governance regime since the 1990s should cause those most exercised 
about state incursion on spheres of autonomy to celebrate the injection of 
mandatory norms into China’s increasingly contractarian company law 
regime. Writing more than a decade ago, Professors Bill Alford and Shen 
Yuanyuan described a still common vision about “law” and its power in 
the PRC’s reform era: 
Law . . . [is] increasingly seen in both academic and policy circles 
as critical to the attainment for Chinese of fuller economic, politi-
cal[,] and social freedoms. In part, the prominence accorded to law 
is attributable to its perceived potential, however imperfectly real-
ized to date in the PRC, to facilitate the above described transfer of 
power from state to society by limiting the spheres of life over 
which the former has authority and providing constraints as to the 
manner in which such authority is to be exercised. No less im-
portantly, law is extolled for the vital role it has to play, once the 
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state has receded, in establishing the proverbial ‘level playing field’ 
on which a new society is to be grounded. In contrast to the avow-
edly political and highly particularistic manner in which the Chinese 
state historically reached into citizens’ lives, law is commended for 
being facilitative, rather than determinative, providing a neutral 
framework through which citizens, each endowed with the same 
rights and each entitled to invoke the uniform procedural protection 
that formal adjudication is intended to provide, may work things out 
for themselves . . . .
98
 
But Alford and Shen then very wisely cautioned against an automatic or 
total embrace of “law” as an instrument for the protection of private 
freedoms: 
Compelling though the rationales for a drastically circumscribed 
role for the Chinese state may be, they do not provide us with a suf-
ficiently nuanced metric for thinking about freedom in the PRC. 
Without slighting the values to which this vision speaks, we need 
soberly to confront difficult questions regarding . . . the ways in 
which even the most seemingly neutral rules intended to do no more 
than structure autonomous decision-making, may shape outcomes 
and have an impact on freedom.
99
 
Professors Alford and Shen were writing about the PRC Marriage 
Law and the incursion of protective and empowering state regulation into 
the domestic marriage sphere, but we may apply their nuanced and skep-
tical view to the development of corporate law in China. If we recognize 
a distinction between the state as an overbearing economic actor spawn-
ing a parade of controlling shareholders, on one hand, and the state as a 
(potentially) publicly interested regulator, on the other, we may perceive 
a new vision of the CSRC’s serial mandatory-type regulatory incursions 
into the province of mostly enabling legal corporate governance. For in 
the PRC’s “corporatization” program, we are confronted with a notional 
and mostly rhetorical retreat “under law” (the enabling Company Law 
specifically) of the state, a “retreat,” which in fact cloaks the reassertion 
or maintenance of concentrated power (the state metamorphosed into a 
politically privileged controlling shareholder), in a situation where the 
controlling parties make sure formally conferred “legal” protections for 
                                                             
 98. William P. Alford & Shen Yuanyuan, Have You Eaten? Have You Divorced? Debating the 
Meaning of Freedom in Marriage in China, in REALMS OF FREEDOM IN MODERN CHINA 234, 235–
36 (William C. Kirby ed., 2004) (“We would do well . . . to be mindful of the perhaps singular ca-
pacity of the state to curb private abuses of power and structure an environment in which freedom 
might be widely enjoyed.”). 
 99. Id. 
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the exploited minority are not utilized (e.g., the absence of listed compa-
ny corporate governance cases in the Chinese courts and blocks against 
multi-party actions of any kind). The only effective remedy for this dep-
rivation of even limited autonomy and basic fairness embodied in the 
structurally determined exploitation of minority shareholders, and the 
inability of the system to apply and enforce whatever “legal” protections 
are on offer, is state intervention of another sort: the injection by a state 
institution into enabling corporate law of immutable substantive doc-
trines and mandatory corporate governance mechanisms designed to pro-
tect those who will suffer such deprivations and constrain the awesome 
powers vested in the continuing control parties. That is precisely the path 
pursued by the CSRC (and certain other bureaucratic actors) over the last 
several decades, while at the same time effecting a thoroughgoing and 
perhaps aesthetically displeasing cannibalization of China’s corporate 
law—a kind of legal systems “hostile takeover,” which I argue here is 
both absolutely necessary and almost completely benign. 
D. “How” Has the CSRC Pushed Back?—Vertical Systems and         
Horizontal Resistance 
Observers familiar with the contemporary Chinese party state, po-
litical scientists in particular, may have a final provocative question 
when alerted to the way in which the CSRC has created effective con-
straints on the power of China’s state-tied controlling shareholders. That 
“how” question—how is the CSRC inspired to do this and, moreover, 
how does the CSRC get away with it?—is based in a vision of the PRC 
as a unitary, and largely authoritarian, party state where agents of the 
party state penetrate into every aspect of society, from enterprises and 
their controlling shareholders, to government departments, to a judiciary 
wholly lacking in autonomy or independence. Analysts will point to the 
rotation of personnel from top executive positions at China’s corpora-
tized SOEs into top regulatory jobs or senior central or local government 
postings as proof of this reality.
100 If that vision is even partially correct, 
then there should be no allowance for an expert agency like the CSRC 
(with no economic and little independent political power) to conceive 
                                                             
 100. The career of Shang Fulin, head of the CSRC until October 2011, is a case in point. Be-
fore he was appointed head of the CSRC in December 2002, he was President of the Agricultural 
Bank of China. Since October 2011, he has served as head of the CSRC’s sister commission with 
jurisdiction over the financial institutions, the China Banking Regulatory Commission. His prede-
cessor at the CSRC, Zhou Xiaochuan, now the head of China’s central bank, was formerly the presi-
dent of the China Construction Bank. In March 2013, Shang Fulin’s successor at the CSRC, Guo 
Shuqing, moved from the CSRC to a post as Deputy Party Secretary and Governor of Shandong 
Province. These rotations are duplicated at all levels of the party state. 
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and implement mechanisms that limit the power of, or seek to hold ac-
countable, far better-endowed actors—SOEs and their controlling share-
holders and the sprawling systems of political economic power they 
spring from. 
It turns out that there is very little contemporary writing about the 
PRC that explores what might be at work in this specific situation,
101 and 
thus, I am led to speculate on answers to the “how” questions. (This is 
not the place to address the possible sources of the CSRC’s concrete 
power, as opposed to the agency’s normative power, and answer the spe-
cific questions political scientists are usually concerned with—e.g., what 
rank does the CSRC and its party organ have in the state bureaucracy and 
the party system, respectively? What, or whose, patronage network does 
the CSRC lie in? What individual or groups of leaders have empowered 
the CSRC at different times in its development? What resources are the 
CSRC able to attract, and conversely, what resources does it control? Is 
the CSRC able to resist agency capture, and how?) Instead, my specula-
tions on the “how” questions focus on the CSRC’s normative power 
against SOEs and the systems that support them, and three ideas that re-
veal a new identity of the horizontal aspect of what has been called the 
PRC’s “fragmented authoritarianism”: (i) the CSRC’s perception of its 
role as the “ministry” of capital markets development, empowered to act 
against other, more sector-specific, concentrations of political and eco-
nomic power like SOE systems; (ii) the relatively “central” (versus “lo-
cal”) basis and “all sectors” (versus specific sector) orientation of its 
                                                             
 101. There is an abundant political science literature on China’s “fragmented authoritarian-
ism,” which focuses on how vertical (from center to locality) governmental and bureaucratic sys-
tems work in conjunction, or not, across horizontal lines (within a given geographic area). This 
literature is strongly associated with the work of University of Michigan political scientist Ken 
Lieberthal. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: 
LEADERS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 3–34 (1988); Kenneth Lieberthal, Introduction: The 
“Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS AND 
DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1, 1–32 (Kenneth Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 
1992); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA—FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 186–
88 (2004). Political scientist Andrew C. Mertha has also written more recently on this aspect of PRC 
governance. See Andrew C. Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization of 
the Chinese Policy Process, 200 CHINA Q. 1 (2009); Andrew C. Mertha, Policy Enforcement Mar-
kets—How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes to Effective Intellectual Property Implementation 
in China, 38 COMP. POL. 295 (2006). All of these studies, however, focus on horizontal competition 
(or, in Professor Mertha’s case, redundancy in enforcement) between vertically arranged governmen-
tal and bureaucratic actors, and usually with respect to specific policy decisions or approvals. This 
Article reveals a new and different identity of the horizontal contest where there is ever-increasing 
enmeshment of political and economic power, the spectacle of a central government agency creating 
preenforcement designs that systemically constrain the economic and directorial power of a supreme-
ly powerful, non-governmental, non-regulatory constituency, SOEs, and their controlling sharehold-
ers. 
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power and the use of it; and (iii) the possibility that those SOEs and con-
trolling shareholders that are seeing their power challenged may accept 
such constraints so as to preserve viable capital markets that they can 
access going forward for much-needed finance capital. 
The CSRC was indeed the first independent agency, and subse-
quently ministry-level body, in the PRC’s history with jurisdiction over 
an area that is not a specific industrial sector, but a market activity in an 
increasingly market economy. Thus, just as, for example, the Ministry of 
Textile Industry governed the PRC’s entire textile industry and its pro-
ductive SOEs, the CSRC can be seen as the Ministry of Capital Mar-
kets—a regulator certainly, but also a government department charged 
with maintaining both the integrity and attractiveness of China’s domes-
tic capital markets. This sense of ownership of the capital markets, and 
investment in the success of the same, may contribute to the CSRC’s 
concrete moves to resist the power of even politically well endowed 
SOEs and their supporting systems (coupled with affirmative regulation 
of the issuers, funds, brokers, underwriters, and accountants it is charged 
with oversight of). Second, the CSRC is very much an organ of the cen-
tral government, which is not tied to or reliant upon any given industrial 
or manufacturing sector. Most large SOE systems are also anchored in 
some kind of central authority (usually a former ministry metamorphosed 
into a group holding company), but their political and economic interest 
quickly stretches into lower level, and thus localized, operations, and 
usually limited to a specific sector (e.g., telecoms, power generation, 
etc.). Thus, while we may think of such SOE systems as all-powerful and 
rooted in the “center,” they can in fact be challenged by a purely central 
sectorally non-affiliated organ like the CSRC. Third, there may be SOE 
systems and the controlling shareholders they have spawned who are 
supportive (or at least tolerant) of the appearance and the reality of for-
mal constraints on their governance power within a specific listed firm as 
the price of functioning, apparently level-playing field, and investment-
attracting capital markets, something they desperately need to continue 
serving their corporate finance needs.
102
 This idea is different from a 
                                                             
 102. While this idea may be surprising, and even unlikely, in the Chinese or any context, it is 
precisely the dynamic at work in India, where in 2001 the securities regulator implemented the SOX-
like (but pre-SOX) “Clause 49” reforms (added to stock exchange listing requirements) based upon 
the recommendations of the 1999 Kumarmangalam Birla Committee, which recommendations in 
turn were based upon a voluntary 1998 Corporate Governance Code devised by none other than the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). The CII is an organization made up of, and representing the 
interests of, India’s largest public firms. See Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Can Corpo-
rate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Value? Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 749, 759 (2007) (“Corporate governance reform efforts in India were largely triggered 
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common trope about corporate governance reform in the PRC that every 
reform step is merely signaling to foreign capital investment, whether via 
private investment or the public capital markets. Here, the focus is on 
what these SOE systems and the controlling shareholders understand 
they need to do (or at least can stomach) to gain Chinese capital invest-
ment through the public capital markets. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While at first blush the CSRC program described in this Article 
seemingly offends against bedrock principles of the highly articulate an-
ti-“quack corporate governance” constituency, settled ideas of what ena-
bling corporate law should be in modern capitalist economies, and equal-
ly strong concerns for always-endangered realms of private “freedom” or 
autonomy, on reflection it accomplishes something far more positive. 
The program provides effective mechanisms for the protection against 
exploitation of minority shareholders (which exploitation, as demonstrat-
ed above, is the necessary consequence of China’s “corporatization with-
out privatization” program), and thereby makes financing easier for those 
seeking to raise capital (whether repackaged SOE or truly “private” en-
trepreneurial firm), investment more attractive for those interested in 
contributing capital, and the allocation of capital more efficient overall—
precisely the policy goals invoked when advocating the merits of ena-
bling corporate law and autonomous private action under the program. 
Certainly, the applied remedy described herein—mandatory provi-
sions injected via administrative agency fiat into an enabling corporate 
law regime to confer greater power on minority investors and thus spur 
investor participation in the capital markets—seems freighted with irony 
or contradiction. Yet, as I hope to have demonstrated here, it is a very 
good response to the circumstances presented by China’s unique political 
economy, and the particular evils arising from the “corporatization with-
out privatization” of Chinese SOEs, with retention of absolute power by 
party state forces metamorphosed—by operation of “law” no less—into 
controlling shareholders of new, dominated, corporations. 
                                                                                                                                        
by CII’s promulgation of its Corporate Governance Code in 1998. CII then followed up by lobbying 
SEBI to implement mandatory reforms – presumably consistent with the CII Code. . . . Much like 
the Business Roundtable in the United States, major Indian firms were the interest group most likely 
to oppose governance reform. Instead, however, CII initiated the reform effort.” (emphasis in origi-
nal)); Nicholas C. Howson & Vikramaditya Khanna, The Development of Modern Corporate Gov-
ernance in China and India, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 513, 527–31 (Muthucu-
maraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010). 
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Some will complain that the CSRC-designed and implemented 
remedy applies to a very small subset of all firm establishments in the 
PRC—approximately 2,500 listed companies and 100 securities firms in 
a country with more than 550,000 LLCs and 100,000 CLSs.
103 This con-
cern is well founded in 2013, but it fails to take account of two ongoing 
developments. First is the CSRC’s initial move, effective January 1, 
2013, asserting regulatory jurisdiction over unlisted but deemed “public 
companies”—CLSs with more than 200 shareholders, or which have is-
sued shares “to the general public” (shehui gongzhong) and “in a public 
manner” (yi gongkai fangshi).104 If successful, this extension of CSRC 
regulatory authority will result in a large portion of the approximately 
100,000 CLSs in China being subject to the corporate governance norms 
described here. Second is the process revealed in this writing: the way in 
which CSRC regulation applicable in the first instance to only listed 
companies and securities firms eventually finds its way into China’s 
basic corporate law applicable to all business enterprises domiciled in 
China (other than WSOCs). While the latter process provides no imme-
diate or irrevocable assurances to the most impatient reformers, it does 
augur well for a better and more effective legal corporate governance 
system in the not too distant future.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Selected PRC Regulatory Enactments Affecting       
Corporate Governance 
                                                             
 103. These approximate numbers were provided to the author by corporate and securities law 
specialist Professor Tang Xin of the Tsinghua University Law School in April 2013. 
 104. See CSRC, Feishangshi Gongzhong Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Banfa [Supervisory and Ad-
ministration Measures for Non-Listed Public Companies] zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyu-
anhui ling [2012] 85 (promulgated by CSRC, Sept. 28, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), arts. 2(1), 2(2), 
available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201/201210/t20121011_2156 89.htm. 
These Measures certainly foresee substantial intrusion into the corporate governance system appli-
cable to such unlisted “public companies,” for instance with respect to mandatory articles of associa-
tion for such firms, chapt. II, “Corporate Governance,” art. 6: “The CSRC shall, in accordance with 
law, make specific stipulations regarding the mandatory provisions [“bibei tiaokuan”] of the articles 
of association for public companies and regulate the development and amendment of the articles of 
association of public companies.” Bibei tiaokuan is the same linguistic formulation used for the 
Mandatory Articles of Association for Overseas Listing Companies, supra note 23, and stronger than 
the term used for the Guidance Articles of Association for Listed Companies, supra note 23 (zhiyin 
or “guidance”). Of course, a question remains as to how the CSRC will enforce the adoption of these 
mandatory corporate constitutions, or indeed any provision of the Measures for Non-Listed Public 
Companies or subsequent regulation based in the Measures, without the threat of a withheld listing 
or de-listing available to it with respect to listed CLSs. 
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